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Abstract
Several fairness definitions have been proposed in the machine learning literature to rectify the issue
of demographic groups being treated differently. Given the substantial research in the field, this work
aims to provide an entry-level overview of the common definitions and metrics that are essential
for a novice reader in the field. In addition, we propose a theorem, where we look at different
population distributions and conditions under which our claim holds, that is the disadvantaged
individual is expected to be more talented than similar performing advantaged individual. Finally,
this work summarizes the six research works and discusses whether the result of our theorem is
consistent in each of research work’s model settings, culminating in a discussion of how all the
authors view the world in terms of a group’s talent distribution.
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Machine bias is prevalent in several machine learning applications where the classifier mimics the
partial behaviour in the data used while training. With many recent studies proving vulnerability
of these classifiers to the same biases as those of humans, such as the ProPublica Article[7]
demonstrating the bias of Compass (an AI Software tool) against black individuals in predicting
recidivism, the research in fairness has increased significantly[25] in the last decade.
Most research works[19, 18, 25, 1] in the ML literature assume that the disadvantaged
group generally performs worse on standardized tests in the world. While such assumptions are
pragmatic, these models portray a disparate talent distribution amongst groups. In this work, we
assume that all the groups have a similar distribution of talents and it is the external factors that
affect different groups differently.
1.1 Problem and Motivation
Given the substantial research approaches in the field of Machine Learning Fairness, the area has
grown complex and is often hard to understand for a novice reader. This work seeks to provide
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a comprehensive review (Chapter 2) of the state of the art theoretical fairness research works.
This chapter would introduce a beginner to the terminology and common methods in the Fairness
literature in machine learning (ML). We discuss generic concepts such as finding sensitive attributes
and several approaches of formal measures of fairness (such as individual and group fairness).
Furthermore, we discuss the fairness measures, which are the most common ways of assessing
fairness of a ML classifiers, such as Demographic Parity and Equal Opportunity. We conclude this
section with a brief discussion about the fairness intervention approaches found in the ML Literature.
Such approaches can be broadly divided in 3 sub-sections i.e. pre-processing, in-processing and
post-processing.
The second problem that we address in this work is to propose a generic theoretical model
(Section 3.1.1) which instead of assuming a discriminatory view of the world, captures the sources of
disadvantage for particular groups. This model is novel as compared to previous works[19, 18, 25, 1]
as we consider the support environment available to an individual as one of the components in our
model and we hypothesize that the environment consideration would help fix the bias discrepancy.
Considering the model, we start with the research problem where we show that if two
individuals have a similar performance score on a test (such as on a Job Interview or SATs),
then the disadvantaged individual is expected to have a higher talent score. In order to provide
a comprehensive analysis on this theorem, we consider several different possible combinations
of Talent and Environment distributions (such as Gaussian, Uniform, and other more complex
distributions) and show that under which scenarios can we guarantee that our argument holds. We
also discuss some counterexamples of possible distributions under which the theorem’s claim will
not hold. We start with an informal discussion and Uniform Talent and Environment distributions
in Section 3.2.1 and then transition into Gaussian distribution in Section 3.3. Following that, we
discuss a property which we call “log-concave” for a distribution curve for which our claim holds.
Then, we discuss a some examples and counter-examples for the “log-concave” distributions.
Finally, from Chapter 4 onwards we provide a detailed review of seven research works
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[19, 18, 26, 25, 1, 12] which we believe are the most relevant to our work. For each of the research
works, we have outlined a brief summary of the model, the assumptions and the population
distribution. We then discuss the main results for the research works and then analyse that
whether our theorem’s result would be consistent in the respective model given its assumptions.
We culminate with a discussion about the worldview comparison of each of the works compared to
our model’s worldview. As we consider that all individual groups are born equal and the talent
distribution is the same across groups, we discuss whether we find this well reflected in the models
of these other research works.
1.2 Research Objectives and Questions
Apart from the literature review in machine learning fairness, the goal of this research is to answer
the following research question– under which possible combinations of Talent and Environment
distributions (such as Gaussians, Uniform, and other more complex distributions) and under which
scenarios can we guarantee that our theorem’s argument holds. Of course, the argument is that if
two individuals have a similar performance score on a test (such as on a Job Interview or SATs),
then the disadvantaged individual is expected to have a higher talent score.
We consider different cases of Talent and Environment distributions starting with Uniform
and Gaussian distributions. We then divide the problem more generically into two parts, first
considering what we refer to as graceful Talent distributions and any arbitrary Environment
Distribution that we refer to as non-extreme score values. The second part considers the complement
of the first i.e. with Non-graceful Talent or Extreme score values.
3
1.3 Contributions
With the recent growth on research in mitigating bias and promoting fairness in ML-based classifiers,
the area is has become complex and hard to penetrate for newcomers to the domain. Hence, the
first contribution (Chapter 2) of thesis seeks to provide an overview of the different schools of
thought and approaches to mitigating (social) biases and increase fairness in the ML literature.
Our second contribution is the bias model we propose. Our motivation behind proposing
a new model was that many research works appeared to reflect discriminatory worldview where
they considered that the disadvantaged groups are inherently less talented. In this work, we aim to
provide a model for equal distribution of talent among groups by taking the support environment
of the individuals of different demographic groups as an input to our model, in order to address
past discrimination. We believe that the talent is equitably distributed amongst demographic
groups, however due to unequal access to resources and support for specific group’s individuals, they
generally tend to perform worse on standardised tests or interviews. We believe that considering
the environment aspect in the model will help yielding a more just and accurate outcome by the
classifier. The model discussed in Section 3.1.1 will demonstrate the consideration of environment
variable to the scores we observe for an individual. We hypothesize that the performance scores
that individuals get for example SAT scores for the students or an interview assessment test, is not
simply a representation of their talents but also of the support environments available around them.
The environment could be their education, household income or the country they are born in.
Our third contribution, (Chapter 3) which is the first theorem result shows that if two
individuals have a similar performance on a screening test, the individual from the disadvantaged
group is expected to be more talented than the advantage group’s individual since in general the
advantaged group individual has better support environment. We have considered several different
possibilities of the distribution types for both Talent/Environment and illustrated both graphically
and formally that for which distribution our main claim would hold.
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Finally, this work considers the six most relevant research works (Chapter 4) which focus
on achieving Group Fairness notions and have detailed summary of the model, assumptions and
main conclusions of each of the research works. In addition, we compare the models with our work
and verify whether our theorem’s assumptions and conclusion are consistent with the modelling
presented in the work. Finally, we analyze the different worldviews of research works, i.e. how
the model views the population distribution of the world. We see that while there are a few
models[1, 26], with which the worldviews closely align with our model’s belief– that talent is the
evenly distributed for both the groups– there are others which view the world from a discriminatory




Common Literature & Background
2.1 Related Work
Our proposed model was inspired by Kannan et al.[19], which considers a two staged model of
screening decision— first, the students are admitted to the college on the basis of high school grades
(which are a noisy signal of the student’s talent) and second the admitted students are hired by the
employer based on college grades(again a noisy signal of talents). Our model on the other hand
is single staged, where the performance scores are a noisy and biased estimate of the underlying
talent. We introduce the bias and noise in our model by considering the environment as one of the
components in determining the performance of the individuals.
In order to model disadvantage or bias in the system, several recent research works
[25, 19, 18] have considered separate distributions of scores for the two groups, with the disadvantaged
group having a stochastically lower distribution as compared to the advantaged. We have followed
a similar approach in our model setup, although we consider that the Talent distributions of the
two groups is exactly the same.
An interesting distinction was proposed by Friedler et al. [12]. Their discussion introduced
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the concept of Construct Space, which is the attribute that is truly relevant for prediction task
and the Observed Space, which is the distribution space of performance scores that are accessible
to the decision maker. One could also compare our model with this framework, where talent and
environment distributions would be a part of the Construct Space while the performance scores of
the Observed space.
Several recent research works also compare fairness measures such as demographic parity
(DP) and equal opportunity (EO). DP has been considered in numerous recent fairness papers
[4, 27] and was proposed in Dwork et al.[11]. A recent work by Hardt et al. (2016)[16] introduced
the concept of equality of opportunity. We formally define these fairness measures in the Section
2.4. While we primarily looked at papers which considered group fairness notions, one of the papers
we came across during our research was Roth et.al.[9], which considered individual fairness notion
i.e. that all similar individuals should be treated similarly.
2.2 Defining Sensitive Attributes
Almost all fairness policies require the knowledge of sensitive attributes in the data-set to minimize
bias against the unprivileged groups. One might argue that simply removing sensitive attributes
could help resolve the bias in a classifier, however many studies such as Liu et al. [25] show that
unconstrained learning harms the disadvantaged. Therefore, before continuing with the study of
fairness in ML, a discussion on how to decide these protected attributes is essential.
Common examples of sensitive attributes are gender, age and race. However there are
not so common sensitive attributes which could encompass any feature of the data that involves
or concerns people. There could be features which are strongly correlated to protected variables,
and not considering such features as sensitive could make the model discriminate against the
underprivileged group. While legally governments generally define the sensitive attributes such as
race, gender and age [31], yet, there is still the question of variables that are not strictly sensitive,
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but have a relationship with one or more sensitive variables. One of the examples of such an
attribute is the address of an individual which could be used to ascertain the group membership of
an individual with high accuracy [6].
A few approaches try to anonymize data by finding correlation between explicitly sensitive
data and other features such as graph and network-based[32] methods for discovering proxies, which
are features correlated to sensitive attributes. One of the more common approach is to use causal
methods to find correlation[6].
Finding a positive correlation among sensitive and any other attribute does not guarantee
that the attribute is a proxy of the sensitive attribute. Therefore, several recent works[14, 29]
focus on finding causal relationship among the sensitive and non-sensitive variables. The main
objective behind using causal methods is to uncover relationships in the data and find dependencies.
Therefore, causal methods considered to be the most efficient methods to identifying proxies
of sensitive variables[15]. However determining the causal relationship between variables is an
inherently difficult problem. Existing methods rely on strong assumptions and there is no agreed
upon definition of causality.
2.3 Fairness Metrics: Group v/s Individual Fairness
Fairness Metrics could either be a group based for instance ensuring equality across men and women,
or it could be individual based having the idea that all similar individual should be treated similarly.
Group fairness notions try to equalize the two demographic groups, such as demographic parity
where the selection rates across the groups are equal. Often in group fairness to ensure equality, the
members of the disadvantaged group are given an advantage (affirmative action)[19] which comes
at the cost of individual fairness being impossible.
Individual fairness, as its name suggests, focuses on individuals rather than the entire
groups. It was first proposed in Fairness Through Awareness by Dwork et al.[11] in 2012, which
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is one of the most important foundational papers in the field. The notion of individual fairness
emphasizes that all similar individuals should be treated similarly i.e. rather than focusing on
group, we tend to care more about the individuals. Besides, individual fairness is more fine-grained
than any group-notion fairness: it imposes restriction on the treatment for each pair of individuals.
Several studies show that Individual and Group fairness are irreconcilable[3] and cannot
co-exist apart from non-degenerate group score distributions. Non-degenerate score distributions
implies that the features or scores of the two groups have the same distribution, and if this is the
case then we can achieve individual and group fairness together. However, non-degenerate cases are
rare in real world situations and there exists several studies which have shown this tension between
individual and group fairness[30, 8, 21]. In our survey, we have we have primarily focused on Group
Fairness notions, while we also looked at one research work with individual fairness [9].
2.4 Group Fairness Policies and Impossibility Theorem
The most common way to assess fairness is to compare the outcome of the classifier for the two
groups and if there is a discrepancy, we find ways to fix it. The crux of most fairness research lies
in how to compare the output of the model’s classifier and compare its result for the two groups.
There are numerous different fairness policy definitions[28] which have been proposed over
time about how to compare the classifier’s output for the two groups to ensure fairness. This also
gives rise to the impossibility theorem which states that although most of the fairness criterion are
achievable individually [10], these fairness criterion are not achievable simultaneously as shown by
Kleinberg et. al[23]. This section will next discuss the fairness measures which are common across
the literature we review. Consider that a positive outcome by a classifier represents something
good in the society like a loan. Although this list is not exhaustive, the below 4 fairness measures
are the most relevant to our work and the thesis will discuss each in detail.
In statistical learning theory, we model the data generation from a probability distribution
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on the Cartesian product of domain set X and label set Y i.e. P = X × Y. Considering this
terminology, we consider the definitions in the following sections.
2.4.1 Demographic Parity
One of the earliest definitions of fairness, this metric defines fairness discussed in Dwork et al. ([11]),
states that the proportion of each segment of a protected class (such as race) should receive the
positive outcome with equal probabilities.
Px∼P (h(x) = 1|x ∈ A) = Px∼P (h(x) = 1|x ∈ B) (2.1)
where {A,B} represent the group membership and h(x) represents a binary classifier’s output
function such that h : X → Y. For the case when h is a randomized classifier, then all the
probabilities in this sections are also over the random bits of the predictor.
2.4.2 Equal Opportunity
Proposed by Hardt et. al.(2016) [16] equal opportunity requires that the true positive rate in Group
B is the same as the true positive rate in Group A i.e. Equal True Positive rates across Groups. It
was first proposed in the fairness literature by Hardt et al. [16].
Px,y∼P (h(x) = 1|y = 1, x ∈ A) = Px,y∼P (h(x) = 1|y = 1, x ∈ B) (2.2)
2.4.3 Predictive Parity
This metric introduced in Zafar et. al [34] ensures that the calibration of the model is not dependent
on the sensitive attribute value. Thus, the probability of correctness of a prediction is the same
for all values of the sensitive attribute. This prevents models from being biased towards making
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incorrect predictions for any sensitive group. If the below two equations hold, for a classifier h,
then it satisfies Predictive Parity.
Px,y∼P (y = 1|h(x) = 1, x ∈ A) = Px,y∼P (y = 1|h(x) = 1, x ∈ B) (2.3)
Px,y∼P (y = 1|h(x) = 0, x ∈ A) = Px,y∼P (y = 1|h(x) = 0, x ∈ B) (2.4)
2.4.4 Equalized Odds
Equalized Odds [16] is a similar notion, also introduced in Hardt et. al.[25]. In addition to requiring
equal true positive rates across groups, equalized odds also requires that the false positive rates are
equal across both groups. Equivalently, we can define equalized odds as h⊥A|Y , meaning that h is
independent of the sensitive attribute, conditioned on the true label Y .
Px,y∼P (h(x) = 1|y = 1, x ∈ A) = Px,y∼P (h(x) = 1|y = 1, x ∈ B) (2.5)
Px,y∼P (h(x) = 1|y = 0, x ∈ A) = Px,y∼P (h(x) = 1|y = 0, x ∈ B) (2.6)
2.4.5 Disparate Impact
Disparate impact was first proposed in the fairness literature by [18] Similar to Demographic Parity,
it is the ratio of positive classification rate of two groups.
Px∼P (h(x) = 1|x ∈ A)




The Impossibility Theorem introduced in Karthik[20] states that no more than one of the three
fairness metrics of demographic parity, predictive parity and equalized odds can hold at the same
time except in non-degenerate cases i.e. when the groups have the same distributions. In non-
degenerate cases, any two of the three criteria discussed in 2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 are mutually
exclusive. Consider that G is the group membership and Y is the “true” label distribution then
consider the below:
1. Demographic Parity VS Predictive Parity: If G is dependent on Y , then either Demographic
Parity holds or Predictive Rate Parity but not both.
2. Demographic Parity v/s Equalized Odds: If G is dependent of Y and Ŷ is dependent of Y ,
then either Demographic Parity holds or Equalized Odds but not both.
3. Equalized Odds VS Predictive Rate Parity: Assume all events in the joint distribution of
(G, Ŷ , Y ) have positive probability. If G is dependent of Y , either Equalized Odds holds or
Predictive Rate Parity but not both.
2.5 Fairness Interventions Approaches
The Fairness in Machine Learning Research could broadly be classified into three separate ways of
applying intervention to a classifier:
2.5.1 Pre-Processing
This approach targets fixing the bias in the Data itself. One of the papers (Jiang et al[17]) we
looked at, followed the pre-processing approach where they claimed that the disadvantaged group’s
members are often underrepresented in the datasets and hence “re-weighted” the sample from that
group.
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Pre-processing is motivated by the assumption that it is often the data itself which is
biased, and the distributions of specific sensitive or protected variables are biased or discriminatory.
Therefore, pre-processing techniques generally fix this bias within data with respect to the sensitive
attributes. After that, the classifier is trained on this “repaired” data set. Pre-processing is argued
to be the most flexible part of the data science pipeline, as it makes no assumptions with respect to
the choice of subsequently applied modeling technique.
An example of pre-processing technique is data reweighing where we change the training
data distribution to correct for the bias process and then train on the new distribution. For instance,
suppose that the individuals from the disadvantaged group are under-represented in the training
data so we can intervene by up-weighting the observed fraction of positives in the training data
from Group B to match the fraction of positives from the advantaged group’s training data.
2.5.2 In-Processing/Constrained Optimization
The constrained optimization approach to apply fairness intervention is the technique used by us in
our findings. In-processing considers that modeling techniques often become biased by dominant
features, other distributional effects, or try to find a balance between multiple model objectives, for
example having a model which is both accurate and fair. In-processing approaches tackle this by
often incorporating one or more fairness metrics into the model optimization functions in a bid to
converge towards a model parameterization that maximizes performance and fairness.
2.5.3 Post-Processing
Post-processing approaches recognize that the actual output of an ML model may be unfair to
one or more protected variables and/or subgroup(s) within the protected variable. Thus, post-
processing approaches tend to apply transformations to model output to improve prediction fairness.
Post-processing is one of the most flexible approaches as it only needs access to the predictions and
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sensitive attribute information, without requiring access to the actual algorithms and ML models.





Our model considers that every demographic group is born with equal inherent capabilities,
regardless of race, gender or the color of their skin. No demographic group is intrinsically different
in the population distribution of their inherent Talent. However, due to societal imbalance of
opportunities and lesser access to education, the disadvantaged group tends to perform worse on
screening decisions or standardized tests such as Job Interviews or SATs. This eventually distorts
the distribution of their performance scores on these tests, which becomes biased against the
disadvantaged group.
To anticipate the difference in support available to different groups, we propose a model
that achieves fair screening decisions with the consideration of the support environment available
to an individual. Presuming that the performance score distribution of the disadvantaged group is
lower than their actual talent scores (due to fewer opportunities available to them), we provide
theoretical arguments of the cases when it is beneficial for the employer to hire individuals of the
disadvantaged group.
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This theorem shows that if two individuals have a similar performance score on a test
(such as on a Job Interview or SATs), then the disadvantaged individual is expected to have a
higher talent score. In order to provide a comprehensive analysis on this theorem, we consider
several different possible combinations of Talent and Environment distributions (such as Gaussians,
Uniform, and other more complex distributions) and prove under which scenarios can we guarantee
that our argument holds.
The Section 3.1.1 will outline the model we propose and the motivation behind the problem
we are trying to solve. Then we start with the simplest case of Uniform Talent and Environment
distributions in Section 3.2.1. Following that, we consider Gaussian distributions for both in
Section 3.3. We then divide the problem more generically into two parts. The first part considers
what we refer to as graceful Talent distributions and any Environment Distribution that refer
to as non-extreme score values. The second part considers the complement of the first i.e. with
Non-graceful Talent or Extreme score values. Finally, Section 3.6 outlines the proofs of the theorems
we outline in this section.
3.1.1 Model
We continue with the model of three distribution spaces that describe the target attribute of a
prediction model from Friedler et al. [1]. The Construct Space(CS) represents the value of the
attribute that is truly relevant for the prediction task, such as Talent of a student. This value is
usually not measurable, so prediction models in a supervised learning problem are instead trained
with a related measurable label, whose values are sampled from the Observed Space(OS). Finally, the
Decision Space(DS) describes the output of the model. We consider two possible group membership
for an individual, that is either A or B and the membership is represented by G ∈ {A,B}.
Construct Space: The construct space consists of two distributions:
Talent Distribution Our main goal is to determine this Talent of an individual where T
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is the random variable chosen from the same talent distribution. Since we do not have
direct access to this space, we want to approximate it using the Observed Space discussed
later.
Environment Distribution: Unlike the previous models [25, 19], we also take into account
the Environment component, which is a measure of how conducive things are around an
individual to promote her success. Let E represent the random variable chosen from the
Environment distribution. We believe that the performance of an individual depends
on the environment around her and therefore considering the environment could help
estimate the talent with more accuracy. To model disadvantage, we assume that the
environments scores of the disadvantaged have a distribution which is not as good as the
advantaged, and the subsequent sections will discuss how specifically the environment
distributions are shifted for the two groups.
The random variable E chosen from the environment distribution will not always be
available during the training phase and we plan to keep it in the Construct Space. If in
case, we have access to the Environment for each individual, then we could also consider
the environment in the Observed Space, which is defined below.
Observed Space(Training Distribution): The observed space contains the feature vectors
correlated to the construct space, for example SAT score, or high school grades to measure
the talent in construct space.
Score Distribution: In order to approximate the Talent T for an individual, we consider
that the employer has access to the performance score X. We presume that the scores
X are influenced by not only the Talent T of an individual but also the environment E.
Hence we consider that the random variable X of scores distribution is the sum of the
Talent Distribution T and Environment Distribution E.
X = T + E (3.1)
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In general, the environment scores are distributed in such a way that they harm the
disadvantaged group, for example in the case of Gaussian distributions, the mean for
Group A is higher than Group B. This difference in distributions will be defined in
each of the scenarios in the coming sections. From now on we consider that TA and TB
represent the random variables for Group A and Group B sampled from the same talent
distribution. Similarly, EA and EB represent the random variables for the environment
distribution. And finally, XA and XB represent the random variables for the score
distribution.
Decision Space (DS): Finally, we consider a trained classifier function h : (X) 7→ {1, 0}, which
could be the output from a machine learning model. Given an input performance vector X,
the function h gives a binary screening decision such as whether to hire a candidate or not.
3.1.2 Motivation
Considering the model and the assumption that Environment for Group A is better, we will now
analyze different distributions starting from Uniform, Gaussians, to some more complex ones and
discuss that for which distributions we can have our theorem’s claim i.e. given two individuals
with the same Performance score x, the disadvantaged individual between the two is expected to
be more talented as she had to undergo more difficulties to reach the same score x. Equation 3.2
represents the formal equivalent of our main claim:
Exp[ t |X=x&G=B] > Exp[ t |X=x&G=A] (3.2)
In addition, if c represents my talent threshold for which we want to hire individuals, then:
∀c, Pr[ t≥c|X=x&G=B] > Pr[ t≥c|X=x&G=A] (3.3)
We argue that an employer wants to know the group membership of an individual since she
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would rather hire someone from the disadvantaged group and in-fact improve the talent expectancy.
In addition, we will consider the difference between the group’s expected talents i.e.
Exp[ t |X=x&G=B]− Exp[ t |X=x&G=A] (3.4)
for Uniform (section 3.2.2), Gaussian (Section 3.3) and other 3.5.1 Distributions of talents and
environments. We will show that in the best case the expected difference is positive, and in the
worst case it could even fall to negative. We will see that two important issues are whether the range
of the Environments E is lower than the Talents T and that the environment has a property that
of log-concave distribution, which include Uniform, Gaussian, and concave distributions (Section
3.5.2).
3.2 Uniform Talent and Environment Distribution
Being the easiest, we will start with all the distributions being uniform. This will allow us to
explain the key issues that will arise in general.
3.2.1 Merging Distributions 〈T,EA〉 and 〈T,EB〉
Our first step is to understand the probability spaces for the two groups and to merge them into
one for comparison. Person A and B both receive their talent T from the same uniform distribution
U ( tmin, tmax ). The B person receives their environment score EB from U( emin, emax ) while the
A person receives EA from the shifted distribution U( emin +K, emax +K ) where K > 0. Their
performance scores are computed as the sum Xg = Tg + Eg. Our assumption is that these two
people received the same performance score x.
Our goal is to compare their talents, i.e. Exp[TA|XA=x] vs Exp[TB |XB =x]. We have
represented the full probability space as the 〈T,EA〉 vs 〈T,EB〉 rectangles in Figure 3.1. Here
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talent is on the y-axis and environment on the x. Each tilted green line represents the narrowed
probability space when conditioned on the performance score being fixed to XA=XB=xi, namely⋃
e TB = x−e & EB = e. Note the equation of each line solves Xg = Tg+Eg giving Tg = xi−Eg.
Note how the y-intercept, TA=xi−(emin+K) vs TB =xi−emin, is x2−x1 higher for x2 than x1
and K lower for group A than group B. Because T , and Eg are uniform, so is the distribution
within each of these green lines. Because we ultimately only care about the talent values, we project
these green lines onto the y-axis giving the distribution [T |Xg =xi]. From their ranges, we can
deduce that the expected talent for x2 is greater by this difference x2−x1 in performance, namely
Exp[Tg|Xg=x2]− Exp[Tg|Xg=x1] = x2−x1 (but this is not always possible).
Figure 3.1: Group A and B’s Distributions when Environment Range is Narrower than Talent’s
Figure 3.2: Representing X ′A and XB on the same image
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For comparison, let us now merge the two groups probability spaces 〈T,EA〉 and 〈T,EB〉
into one. In order to be able to plot them both on the same x-axis, independently draw an
environment score E′A and EB from the same distribution E = U(emin, emax). We advantage the
A person by computing EA = E
′
A +K and XA = TA + EA. Instead lets compute X
′
A = TA + E
′
A
and XA = X
′
A +K. The earlier condition XA=XB =x is equivalent to XB =x and X
′
A=x−K.
As before, A’s y-intercept, TA=x−(emin+K) is K lower than B’s TB=x−emin. Projecting these
green lines onto the y-axis gives the required result that Exp[TB |XB=x]−Exp[TA|XA=x] = K
in the best possible scenarios, but we will see that this difference is not always possible to achieve.
In the next section, we will look at the Talent and Environment Distributions are Uniform
such that the range of the Environments is larger than the Talents i.e. (emax−emin) > (tmax−tmin).
Similar to the case previous case of Narrow Environment, we have a figure representing the score
X ′A and XB on the same figure 3.3. However unlike the previous figure, here we show two possible
values of X which have the same talent values, which is discussed in detail in the next sections.
Figure 3.3: Environment’s range wider than talents.
3.2.2 Extreme x values and function r
In previous section, we considered in more detail the cases where the range of the environment is
narrower than that of talent. Here we will contrast this to the case where it is wider and hence
the noise of the environment makes it harder to estimate the person’s talent. In addition, we will
also look at when the x-values are in the extremes(corners) and define a function r : X → {0, 1, 2}
which we will need for categorizing the region types of x values.
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Denote the talent’s range by [tmin, tmax] and the environment’s by [emin,g, emax,g]. Con-
dition on the fact that the performance score Xg = Tg+Eg is fixed to some value x. Rearranging
and considering the environment range gives that Tg = x−Eg ∈ [x−emax,g, x−emin,g]. If x is an
extreme low value, then this low range x−emax,g becomes smaller than the talent’s low range tmin
and hence the bound tmin kicks in. Similarly, if x is an extreme high value, then the high range
x−emin,g is trumped by tmax. We define r(x) to be the number of endpoint for which this does
not happen, i.e. the number of blue y − axis lines that the green line intersects with. Figure 3.4
gives an example of each of the six cases.
Figure 3.4: Extreme Regions: Environment Range is Narrower vs Wider than Talent’s
In the non-extreme r(x) = 2 case, the Xg = x2 conditioned talent range is Tg ∈ [x−
emax,g, x−emin,g]. In the bottom half-extreme r(x)=1 cases, the Xg=x1 or x4 conditioned talent
range is Tg∈ [tmin, x−emin,g]. In the top half-extreme r(x)=1 cases, the Xg=x3 or x6 conditioned
talent range is Tg ∈ [x−emax,g, tmax]. Finally, in the totally-extreme r(x) = 0 case, the Xg = x5
conditioned talent range is Tg ∈ [tmin, tmax]. In each case, the “green dot” locates the expected
value of Tg within the stated range, i.e. half of the sum of its bottom and top limit. Note that r(x)
also denotes the number of these limits that contains an x term. Hence, if you increase x by δx,
then Exp(Tg) increases by r(x)· 12 ·δx. Figure 3.3 shows how our conditioning is effectively that
XB=x and X
′
A=x−K. Because group A’s effective x value is lowered by K from B’s, Exp(TA)
decreases by r(x)· 12 ·K. This gives the result
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Theorem 1. We randomly choose the birth talent TA and TB of a privileged (group A) and a
disadvantaged (group B) person from the same uniform distribution T .
We randomly choose the environment score EB of the disadvantaged person from a uniform distri-
bution E and privileged EA from E+K, i.e. the same privileged by constant K.
We set their performance to be Xg=Tg+Eg the sum of their talent and performance.
Then we condition on these people having the same performance XA=XB=x.
Let r(x)∈{0, 1, 2} measure how extreme x is.
Then the B people are distributionalally more or equally talented than the A people, namely
Exp[TB |XB=x]− Exp[TA|XA=x] = 12r(x)K (3.5)
This chapter has a section on non-uniform non-extreme (r(x) = 2) cases and another on
non-uniform extreme (r(x) = 0) cases. Before that, however, our next task is to consider Gaussian
distributions. Though Gausians have infinite ranges, the mass is concentrated within a few standard
deviations. As such, we will show that its effective r(x) value is between 0 and 2 depending on the
variances of T , EA, and EB .
3.3 Gaussian Distributions
In this section, we will redo the proof with Gaussian instead of uniform distributions. By the
sum of expectations, we know Exp(X) =Exp(T )+Exp(E). One might be tempted to turn this
around and assume Exp(T |X=x)=x−Exp(E), but we already saw in the uniform case that this
is not true. What is fun, however, is that we can used Bayes’ rule to show that the conditional
distribution [T |X=T+E=x] is also Gaussian.
Theorem 2. Let both groups get the same talent distribution N (µt, σ2t ) and T be the random
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variable drawn from this distribution. Group A gets environment distribution N (µEA , σ2EA) and
group B gets N (µEB , σ2EB ) and let EA and EB represent the respective random variables. The
expected environment of the privileged group is higher, namely µEA−µEB =K. Their performance,
defined by Xg=Tg+Eg, is conditioned to be the same. Then considering that TA, TB , EA and EB
are all independent, it follows that the B person’s conditional talent is expected to be higher, namely















































In Section 3.2.2, we explained that if the environment range is wider than that of talent,
then the noise of the environment makes it impossible to estimate the person’s talent. We defined
r(x) ∈ {0, 1, 2} to measure the extent to which this happens and we proved that the expected
difference in talents in each of these cases is r(x)K2 . Amusingly we can get the same result by





. Unlike the previous section, the difference in expected talent values, and hence
r(x), does not depend on the value of x.
It is worth noting the two extremes. When the environment range is much smaller than
that of talent, i.e. when σ2E  σ2T , then r → 2 and the difference in expected talent values is
maximized, namely Exp(TB−TA|XB = XA) → K. In contrast, when the environment range is
much larger than that of talent, i.e. when σ2E  σ2T , then r → 0 and the difference in expected
talent values is minimized, namely Exp(TB−TA|XB =XA)→ 0. It is also interesting that if the
variance σ2E → 0, then E becomes a constant along with X and hence T =X−E also becomes a








The proof is in the Appendix in Section 3.6.
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3.4 Graceful Talent and Narrow Environment(r(x) = 2)
Our goal is to define a function Fx(tA)= tB so that Pr(TB≥ tB |XB=x) and Pr(TA≥ tA|XA=x)
are close.
Story: To motivate this, consider the following story. Your job is to choose who to accept for
some job/university. Being a mediumly desired job, everyone who applies happens to have
performance level exactly x. Your goal of course is to accept people whose talent is as high as
possible. This paper explains why you should favor people from the disadvantaged B group
over those from the privileged A group. The first step show the cases where the following
holds
Exp(TB |XB=x)−Exp(TA|XA=x) = Exp(EA)−Exp(EB).
Line Them Up by Conditional Talent: But we can say more as follows. Choose N people
from group A and N from B randomly conditioned on their performances being x. Sort each
group by talent into two parallel lines. For each percentile p ∈ [0, 1], get the p·N th person in
each line to shake hands. Let tA and tB denote their respective talent. This can be expressed
as
Pr(TB≥ tB |XB=x) = Pr(TA≥ tA|XA=x)
This might be useful if you suspect that those people whose talent is higher than percentile p
within the privileged group A and higher than the same percentile p within the disadvantaged
group B will likely accept a better offer somewhere else. Or maybe p is the risk level you
are willing to take. Either way our goal is to compare these two talent levels by defining the
function tB = Fx(tA) mapping between them and by proving that tB > tA. Ideally, we even
obtain (tB−tA) ≈ (Exp(EA)−Exp(EB)).
Shift Line: In some worst cases which we will discuss in the coming sections, to get the desired
result i.e. (tB−tA) ≈ (Exp(EA)−Exp(EB)), the p·N th B person not shake the hand of the
person directly across from them but will need to shift over to less talented A people, and
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shake hands with the (p+p∆)·N th A person. Here is p∆ is a parameter that is zero when the
talent distribution T is uniform and is bounded when it is graceful.
Extreme Values (r(x) = 2): We consider that the talent and environment distributions are
confined to a bounded interval similar to the Uniform distribution case.
In order to prove that when they have the same performance value XA = XB = x, a
disadvantaged person is expected be more talented, we must estimate the talent t ∈ T of
a person from her performance score x ∈ X. The noise making this estimating hard is the
person’s environment eg ∈ Eg. In an extreme case, the range within which these environment
values lie is wider than that for the talent. In this case, this noise overwhelms our signal and
all the information about the talent is lost. In this section, we give quite a comprehensive
version of the theorem under the condition that the performance measure x is extreme, i.e.
r(x) = 2. More formally, this means that the talent range [X−emax, X−emin] imposed by
the environment is a subset of the range [tmin, tmax] imposed by the talent.
Defn 〈s1, s2〉-graceful: The section requires that the talent distribution T is what we call 〈s1, s2〉-
graceful. We know that something similar is needed because Figure 3.6.a gives an example
of a non-graceful talent distribution for which the section’s result does not hold because the
probability weights on the edges of the talent ranges is very small (infinitesimally small).
Let the range of talent values be denoted by [tmin, tmax]. Because the area under its density
function PT (t) is one, the average value of PT (t) is
1
tmax−tmin . Our graceful condition requires
that its minimum value at least an s1 factor of this, namely MintPT (t) ≥ 1s1(tmax−tmin) . If its
density function PT (tg) was a line from zero to a maximum probability, then this maximum
value would be 2tmax−tmin and the slope would be
2
(tmax−tmin)2 . Our graceful condition requires
that this slope is never more than s2(tmax−tmin)2 . Define p∆ = s1s2
tB−tA
tmax−tmin . If the talent
distribution T is uniform, then s2 =0. Though we want the group’s talent difference tB−tA
to be as large as possible, we are assuming that it is small relative to the size of the range
[tmin, tmax].
Defn Privileged Environment: We say that group A is privileged over group B if their envi-
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ronment distributions are such that when ever Pr(EB≥eB) = Pr(EA≥eA), we have that
eB  eA. Note that this does not say that the highest advantaged B person is less advantaged
than the lowest advantaged A person. Again, we sort each group but this time by their
environment value. For each percentile p ∈ [0, 1], get the p·N th person in each line to shake
hands. Let eA and eB denote their respective environments. Because group A is privileged
over B, the A person would have a significantly better environment value, giving eB  eA.
Theorem 3. Here we only consider xg that are non-extreme performance scores, i.e. r(xg) = 2. If
both groups have the same uniform talent distribution T , group A is privileged over group B with
respect to their environment distributions EA and EB, and the measure of performance is the sum
Xg = Tg+Eg of the talent and environment, then
Exp(TB |XB=x)−Exp(TA|XA=x) = Exp(EA)−Exp(EB).
P r(TB≥ tB |XB=xg)=Pr(TA≥ tA|XA=xg) =⇒ tB > tA.
Theorem 4. The talent random variables TA and TB for the two groups are drawn independently
according to the same arbitrary 〈s1, s2〉-graceful distribution (i.e. almost uniform). The environment
random variables E′A and EB are drawn independently according to the same arbitrary distribution
and then define EA = d ·E′A+k for constants d and k. Define each person’s performance to be
Xg=Tg+Eg. Consider only the people whose performance is Xg=x. Here x needs to be non-extreme,
i.e. r(xg) = 2. (This will require talent’s range to be wider than the environment’s.) Suppose we
sort each conditioned group according to their talent and shift these lines so that the A person with
talent tA is shaking hands with the B person with talent TB=F (TA)=TA+k+(d−1)eB. (Written
to make it clear that TB=TA+K when d=1. Here eB=x−TB. The amount that these lines need
to shift is p∆ = Pr(TA≥TA|XA=x)− Pr(TB≥TB |XB=x). The result is that this required shift is
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small as long as the talent range is much bigger than the difference in their talents or the graceful
parameters make the talent distribution almost uniform, i.e. p∆≤s1s2 tB−tAtmax−tmin .
See Figure 3.5. The proof is in the Appendix in Section 3.6.
Corollary 5. Having a more general performance score computed by Xg = X(Tg, Eg) = u·Tg+v·Eg+x0
(at least locally within the range t∈ [tA, tB]) has no effect on the result, because one can achieve
the same effect, by first scaling the uniform talent distribution and both environment distributions
linearly.
Figure 3.5: Graceful Talent and Non-Extreme X
The next section will consider such remaining cases.
3.5 Non-Graceful Talent or Wide Environment(r(x) = 0)
Because this section handles the harder cases, the results are not as good. Before we were able
to prove that the conditioned talent of the B group is O(K) bigger than that for A. This is no
longer the case. Instead, we sometimes we might be able to prove B is slightly better, but there are
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Figure 3.6: Though the values are not officially extreme because the range of the talent distribution
is artificially large, the talent distribution is effectively uniform in a very narrow range, making
all values extreme. In the (a) figure, this gives an example of a non-graceful T that does not have
the properties stated in Theorem 4. In the (b) figure, because the B person is completely in the
infinitesimal part of T , the probability of this occurring is infinitesimal. However, conditioned on
this event happens, his expected T value is K bigger than A’s.
abnormalities, where group A is better. What make the difference between these cases turns out to
be whether the Environment distributions is what we call log-concave or not.
The previous section handled the cases in which the talent distribution T is uniform and
the performance values are not extreme. This section does the complement. It allows for arbitrary
(worst case) talent distributions T and/or allows extreme values. Amusingly these two concepts have
much the same effect, namely that even after conditioning on the same performances XA=XB=x,
the range of talents of the two groups, are effectively the same. Lets review. The talent’s range
was denoted by [tmin, tmax] and the environment’s by [emin,g, emax,g]. Condition on the fact that
the performance score Xg = Tg+Eg is fixed to some value x. Rearranging and considering the
environment range gives that Tg = x−Eg ∈ [x−emax,g, x−emin,g]. When x is an extreme value, the
talent’s original range is a subset of that induced by the environment. Hence, both groups talents
are restricted to the range [tmin, tmax]. See Figure 3.3. Allowing a worst case talent distribution
can cause the same effect even when the values are not extreme. See Figure 3.6.a, If the values are
not extreme, then the talent’s range induced by the environment is a subset of it’s original range.
This means that person A’s conditional talent TA is in the range [x−emax,A, x−emin,A] and B’s
TB ∈ [x−emax,B , x−emin,B ]. The reason B’s expected conditional talent is higher is because this
range is higher. However, this section is allowing for the worst cases talent distributions and as
such the distribution puts effectively little weight on the high talent values t that are possible for B
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and not for A and effectively little on the low high values that are possible for A and not for B.
Instead, all the weight is within some sub-range [t′min, t
′
max] that is possible for both A and for B.
This means that effectively these values are “extreme”. Having the same range, means that there
are no immediate reasons that Exp(TA|XA=x) and Exp(TB |XB=x) are different.
Lemma 1. Log-concave In convex analysis [2], a non-negative function f : Rn → R+ is loga-
rithmically concave (or log-concave for short) if its domain is a convex set, and if it satisfies the
inequality:
f(θx+ (1− θ)y) ≥ f(x)θf(y)1−θ
for all x, y ∈ dom f and 0 < θ < 1. If f is strictly positive, this is equivalent to saying that the
logarithm of the function, log.f , is concave; that is,
log f(θx+ (1− θ)y) ≥ θ log f(x) + (1− θ) log f(y)
for all x, y ∈ dom f and 0 < θ < 1.
Theorem 6. Let talent distribution to be arbitrary within the groups shared sub-range [tmin, tmax].
Let group B environment distribution EB be an arbitrary log-concave distribution. Let A’s be
EA = EB +K. Let the performance scores be calculated with Xg = Tg + Eg. It follows that
∀t̂ P r(TB≥ t̂|XB=x) ≥ Pr(TA≥ t̂|XA=x)
Exp(TB |XB=x) > Exp(TA|XA=x)















We will see that this includes Uniform, and Gaussians, and any thing this is concave within the
range and zero outside the range. It fails for distribution that have two levels or are convex.
3.5.1 Intuition Behind Log-Concave Distributions and Examples
The function E(e) = e2 + 1 is clearly convex everywhere and as such does not fit into the above
definition. As suspected Wolfram Alpha plots H(e) = (e2 +1)/((e+1)2 +1) to be decreasing for
e ∈ [−1, 1]. However, it plots to be increasing for e ∈ [1,∞] and hence is also log-concave.
We will now look into further detail the intuition behind the log-concave distributions
with some examples. Note HB(e) is simply the density function for the environment distribution
EB and HA(e)=HB(e− k) is that shifted back by k. In order to understand the ratio HBHA , consider
an example of a concave function in figure 3.7 where the pair of vertical lines represent HA and HB
respectively. Then a curve is considered log-concave if the ratio HBHA is falling as we proceed from
left to right. For example, if we have a pair of lines in the beginning of the curve as demonstrated
in the figure, then the ratio is only falling as we move ahead.
Figure 3.7: An example of Log curve
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3.5.2 Examples of Log-Concave Distributions
Example 1: Let’s consider a curve which is exponentially increasing as in figure 3.8. Let’s consider
that the E(e) = ce, where c > 1 is a constant and e is our environment variable. Then HB = c
(e−eB)
and HA = c
(e−eA). Hence the ratio HBHA = c
(eA−eB), which is a constant. Since this is non-decreasing,
this is a log-concave function.
Figure 3.8: Exponentially Increasing
Example 2: Similar could be argued with an exponentially decreasing distribution, where HB =
c(e−eB), HA = c
(e−eA) and 0 < c < 1 is a constant. Hence the ratio HBHA = c
(eA−eB), is also a
constant. Therefore this is a log-concave function.
Figure 3.9: Exponentially Decreasing
Example 3: Finally, let’s consider the combination of three distributions which we have seen so
far. First is the concave curve in figure 3.7 for which we have shown that the lemma ?? would
hold. Second, consider the exponentially increasing and finally the exponentially decreasing. The
combination of the three figures is demonstrated in the figure 3.10.
We have shown that for each of the individual distributions the lemma would hold, hence
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Figure 3.10: Combination Curve
lets focus on the transition between the distributions in the figure. There are two pairs of HA and
HB highlighted on the figure such that in the first pair, HA is in the exponentially increasing and
HB is in the concave curve, while in the second pair, HA is in the concave curve and HB is in the
exponentially decreasing curve. For both of these pairs, the ratio h = HB/HA is falling, since for
the first pair, HB will have a lower slope than HA because the concave function is not increase at a
faster rate than HA. Same is true for the second pair, where HB will decrease at a faster rate than
the concave function.
Example 4: We first consider a linearly increasing Environment distribution while keeping the
Talent Distributions uniform (figure 3.11) the thickness of the green lines (scores) represents the
probability distribution density. We consider a linearly increasing Environment distribution as a
log-concave function as the fraction h = HB/HA will be constant as described in Section 3.5.1.
Hence the claim follows.
Figure 3.11: Linearly Increasing Environment Distribution
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Example 5: Next, we consider a concave function, which increases linearly and then decreases.
This is demonstrated in figure 3.12. Our hypothesis also holds in this case as we the fraction
h = HB/HA will be constant when xa and xb are both in the first and second half, and the fraction
decreases otherwise.
Figure 3.12: Simple Concave Environment Distribution
3.5.3 Non-Log-Concave Distributions
Example 1: Concave with Uniform Edges Let’s consider an example of a function which is





and deduce that the lemma doesn’t hold. This is because, for the two
pairs highlighted in the figure, the fraction will decrease while the lemma 2 holds, only when this
fraction increases. In the first pair, ÊB is still in uniform while ÊA begins to rise. Similarly, in the
second pair EA enters the uniform while ÊB begins to fall. This makes the ratio decrease for the
two pairs demonstrated in the figure and hence the lemma fails to hold.
Figure 3.13: Concave Ending in Uniform Functions
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Example 2: Step functions We now consider an environment distributions for which our
theorem’s claim fails, i.e. “Single Step” functions or “Bump” distribution function where the
Environment distribution is higher in the beginning and then falls steeply. Given such a distribution
and Uniform Talent distribution in figure 3.14 and 3.15, Our hypothesis fails in this case as if we
look at the values xA and xB , then Exp[T |X=xB ] < Exp[T |X=xA]. In figure 3.14, Group A’s
individual has a higher talent expectation as it has more probability mass in the higher talent
values due to the single step. Similarly, in figure 3.15, Group B’s individual has a lower talent
expectation as it has more probability mass in the lower talent values due to the single step in the
end of the Environment distribution.
Figure 3.14: Single Step Fall Environment and Uniform Talent
Figure 3.15: Single Step Rise Environment and Uniform Talent
Comparison of Single Step to Exponent Function In this part we compare the single step
rising function with the exponentially rising function in figure 3.8. We later demonstrate in Section
3.5.1 that our claim holds for a function which is exponentially rising, while it doesn’t for step
function. We later delve deeper into the discussion about why the expectation claim holds for
exponential but not step.
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Example 3: Convex functions: Suppose that Environment distribution is some convex function
as in figure 3.16 where the environment distribution is large initially, and then it decreases towards
the middle becoming almost uniform and then increases again. In the real world, one could compare
this to a distribution when the gap between the rich and poor is very high, such that the population
is polarized and either they are mostly rich or mostly poor, while the middle class individuals lower
in number.
Then in figure 3.16, if we consider the first pair of the scores, xA will have a higher
probability distribution towards the better talent values as compared to xB. This is because the
slope of curve is large initially and then falls, making the probability of large talents for xA higher
than xB. This violates our main claim. Similar is the case with the middle two values of xA and
xB where while xB is in kind of uniform part of the graph, xa has still a better distribution of
environment for higher talent values. A similar argument could be derived for the last pair of scores.
Hence for this distribution, excluding the extreme x values, one could argue that the claim is false
for all values of x.
Figure 3.16: A Environment Distribution
3.6 Appendix
We give the longer math proofs in this section.
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3.6.1 Proof for Gaussian Distributions
In this section, we will formally discuss the case when the Talent and Environments have
Gaussian Distributions such that EA ∈ N (µEA , σ2EA), EB ∈ N (µEB , σ
2
EB
), TA ∈ N (µTA , σ2T ),
TB ∈ N (µTB , σ2T ) and µTA = µTB (i.e. TA = TB , equality in distribution only). Then assuming that
the Score Distribution XA and XB is the linear sum of Talent and Environment i.e. XA = TA +EA
and XB = TB + EB , then









where K is E(EA − EB).
Proof: Let K be a constant which is defined as the difference between the expected value of EB
and EA, we assume that K > 0 as K = E(EA)− E(EB) > 0
We are interested in finding the following probability, and with Bayes rule:
Pr(TB − TA ∈ [t, t+ dt]
∣∣∣ |XB −XA| < dx) (3.6)
=
Pr(|XB −XA| < dx
∣∣∣ TB − TA ∈ [t, t+ dt])× Pr(TB − TA ∈ [t, t+ dt])
Pr(|XB −XA| < dx)
To determine the individual probabilities on the RHS of 3.6, lets first consider Pr(TB−TA ∈ [t, t+dt]).














Similarly to find the probability Pr(XB −XA < dx), we compute the distribution of XB −XA =
(TB − TA) + (EB − EA) = N
(






Using the standard probability density function for Normal Distributions, we can infer:



















Finally, to find the third probability Pr(XB −XA < dx | TB −TA ∈ [t, t+ dt]), has the distribution
of [|XB −XA| < dx | TB − TA ∈ [t, t+ dt]].
Exp[XB −XA] = Exp[(TB − TA)] + Exp[(EB − EA)] = t−K
To calculate variance of XB − XA | Y = y, we need to take the sum variances of individual
environment distributions. Note we do not consider the variance of talent distribution since we












Using the standard probability density function for Normal Distributions, we can infer that:

















Substituting Equation 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 into 3.6, we conclude:
Pr(TB − TA ∈ [t, t+ dt]





























Equation 3.10 could now be compared to the Probability Density Function of a Normal distribution









































Since K is positive, therefore the expected value(mean) of the above distribution is positive.
3.6.2 Proof for Graceful Talent and Non-Extreme X (r(x) = 2)
The goal of this section is to define a function Fx(tA) = tB so that Pr(TB ≥ tB |XB = x) and
Pr(TA≥ tA|XA=x) are close. To do conditional probabilities, we need to be able to multiply and
divide non-zero probabilities. However, if T is a continuous random variable, then Pr(T = t) = 0
for any specific value of t. The standard way of dealing with this is to define the density function
PT (t) so that Pr(T ∈ [t, t+δt])=PT (t)δt.
Lemma 2. Let PT (t) denote the density function of the talent distribution T and PEg(eg) for
the environment distribution Eg. Then the density function of Pr(Tg ∈ [tg, tg +δt]|Xg = x) is
Px,g(tg) = cgPT (tg)PEg (x−tg) for some constant cg.
Theorem 3 Here we only consider xg that are non-extreme performance scores, i.e. r(xg) = 2. If
both groups have the same uniform talent distribution T , group A is privileged over group B with
respect to their environment distributions EA and EB, and the measure of performance is the sum
Xg = Tg+Eg of the talent and environment, then
Exp(TB |XB=x)−Exp(TA|XA=x) = Exp(EA)−Exp(EB).
P r(TB≥ tB |XB=xg)=Pr(TA≥ tA|XA=xg) ⇐⇒ tB > tA.
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Proof of Theorem 3: Lemma 2 gives that the density function of Pr(Tg ∈ [tg, tg+δt]|Xg =
x) is Px,g(tg) = cgPT (tg)PEg(x− tg), where PT (t) denotes the density function of the talent
distribution T , PEg(eg) for the environment distribution Eg, and cg is a constant. When the
talent distribution is uniform, PT (t) is a constant within its range. Hence, the density function
of Pr(Tg ∈ [tg, tg+δt]|Xg = x) is simply c′gPEg(x− tg). This means that the conditional talent
distributions is just a linear transformation of the environment Xg distribution. Hence, by the
linearity of expectation, Exp(Tg|Xg=x) = x−Exp(Eg). The following two results follow
Exp(TB |XB=x)−Exp(TA|XA=x) = Exp(EA)−Exp(EB).
P r(TB≥ tB |XB=xg)=Pr(TA≥ tA|XA=xg) ⇐⇒ Pr(EB≥x−tB)=Pr(EA≥x−tA).
This says that if the A person received environment value eA=x−tA and the B received eB=x−tA,
then they are at the same percentiles within their respective groups. However, because group A
is privileged over B, the A person would have a significantly better environment value, giving
eB  eA and hence tB  tA.
Theorem 4 If r(xg) = 2, the talent distribution T is 〈s1, s2〉-graceful, the privileged environment
distribution is EA = d·EB+k for arbitrary distribution EB and constants 〈d, k〉, then
Pr(TB≥ tB |XB=xg) ≥ Pr(TA≥ tA|XA=xg)−p∆ ⇐⇒ Fx(tA)= tB= tA+k+(d−1)eB .
Here p∆≤s1s2 tB−tAtmax−tmin and tB= tA+k when EA = EB+k.
Proof of Theorem 4: Our goal is to define a function Fx(tA)= tB so that Pr(TB≥ tB |XB=x)
and Pr(TA≥ tA|XA = x) are close. The A and B person’s performance scores are computed as
the sum Xg = Tg + Eg and these are conditioned to be the same value x. Combining these gives
that Fx(tA) = tB = x−eB = tA+eA−eB. Because the environment distributions EA and EB are
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complicated but related we want to ground our function Fx(tA) = tB by setting eA and eB to be
corresponding points in these distributions, namely Pr(EA ≥ eA) = Pr(EB ≥ eB). Because we
have restricted the privileged distribution to be EA=EB+k, i.e we randomly choose a value E
′
A




A=EB then gives eA−eB = k and
Fx(tA) = tA+eA−eB = tA+K. More generally, we could let EA = d·E′A+k. Setting E′A = EB
then gives Fx(tA) = tB = tA+eA−eB = tA+(d·eB+k)−eB = tA+k+(d−1)eB .
Having defined Fx(tA) = tB = tA + k + (d − 1)eB, our goal now is to compare
Pr(TB ≥ tB |XB = x) and Pr(TA ≥ tA|XA = x). Lemma 2 gives that the density function
of Pr(Tg ∈ [tg, tg + δt]|Xg = x) is Px,g(tg) = cgPT (tg)PEg(x− tg), where PT (t) denotes the
density function of the talent distribution T , PEg (eg) for the environment distribution Eg, and cg








The problem is that for an arbitrary environment distribution PEg(x−Tg), even if the talent
distribution PT (Tg) is linear, we have no idea how to integrate this. The method is to convert each
piece of this integral from A to B person, i.e. PEA(eA)δe = d
−1PEB (eB)δe, PT (TA)−PT (TB)≤∆,
and δtA = d δtb. Then we are sorry to say the constant cg gives us a hard time.
Lets compare the density functions of the two groups environmental distributions. Having
EA=d·EB+K gives PEA(eA)δe = Pr(EA∈ [eA, eA+δe]) = Pr(d·EB+k∈ [eA, eA+δe]) = Pr(EB∈
[eB , eB +d
−1 ·δe]) = d−1PEB (eB)δe.
We also need to bound PT (TA)−PT (TB)≤∆. If the talent distribution T is uniform, then
this is zero. If its density function PT (tg) was a line from zero to a maximum probability, then this
maximum value would be 2tmax−tmin and the slope would be
2
(tmax−tmin)2 . Our graceful condition




The form Fx(tA) = tB = tA+k+(d−1)eB is the best form for seeing that TB ≥ TA+k.



























































CA = c and solving gives cB












= (1+c∆)PB−c∆ ≤ PB−c∆
We were disappointed that the constant cg appears in this result, We are not really
sure why it does. It can be viewed in two ways. First, it appears in the density function
Px,g(tg) = cgPT (tg)PEg (x−tg) to make the area under the function one. Second, 1cg = Pr(Xg=x).
In Figure 3.6.b because the B person is completely in the infinitesimal part of T , the probability of
this occurring is infinitesimal. The makes cB infinitely large. In this case, at least, this is not a
problem because conditioned on this event happens, his expected T value is K bigger than A’s.
In order to deal with the c in PA ≤ PB−c∆, lets get a rough bound on it. Let the range
of talent values be denoted by [tmin, tmax]. Because the area under its density function is one, the
average value of PT (tg) is
1
tmax−tmin . Our graceful condition requires that its minimum value at
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From this we can conclude.







When the talent distribution is uniform, s2 =0 giving PA = PB .
Lemma 2 : Let PT (t) denote the density function of the talent distribution T and PEg(eg) for
the environment distribution Eg. Then the density function of Pr(Tg ∈ [tg, tg+δt]|Xg = x) is
Px,g(tg) = cgPT (tg)PEg (x−tg) for some constant cg.
Proof of Lemma 2: We will drop the subscript g∈{A,B}, because the statements apply to either
group. Because these random variables T and Eg are independent, we can define the cross density
function P (t, e) = PT (t)×PE(e) so that Pr(T ∈ [t, t+δt] & E∈ [e, e+δe]) = δt ·PT (t)× δe ·PE(t) =
δtδe · P (t, e). We could imagine raising a third dimension coming out of the page on the 〈T,E〉
rectangle in the figure, so that its height at location 〈t, e〉 is P (t, e).
Because we have the restriction that x is such that r(x) = 2, the talent range [X−emax, X−
emin] imposed by the environment is a subset of the range [tmin, tmax] imposed by the talent. This
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means that for all values of t that we care about PT (t) is still the density function for talent.
Fix a performance value x of which we will require of all group g people that we are
considering for acceptance. The performance of a person with talent T and environment E is given
by X = T+E. Just to check the accuracy of our figure, if EA = d · EB+K, then the line to which
we restrict the 〈T,E〉 rectangle is x = TA + d ·EB+K or TA = x− d ·EB−K. Note this lowers the
group B line by k and makes its slope −d instead of −1.
Our goal is prove that the probability density function Px(t) = Pr(T ∈ [t, t+δt]|X=x)/δt
of the distribution on talents t that arise under this condition is simply P (t, x−t). If X were
computed by some more complex function, this would not be the case. Using the standard formula
Pr(T ∈ [t, t+δt] & X=x)/Pr(X=x) is awkward because the later is zero. Conditioning on our
probability space amounts to narrowing our 〈T,E〉 rectangle of possibilities to the 1-dimensional
line defined by {〈T,E〉 |x = T +E}. Lets us define the infinitesimal rectangle of possibilities
St = {T ∈ [t, t+δt]} × {E ∈ [x−t−δt, x−t]}. Within this, X is sufficiently close to x, the density
function P (t, e) is sufficiently constant. Hence, we will approximate Pr(T ∈ [t, t+δt] & X=x) with
Pr(St), which is P (t, x−t)·(δt)2. Lets return to the awkward fact that Pr(X=x) is zero. Let’s
define Sx =
⋃
t St to be the union of all of our rectangles within which X is sufficiently close to x.
Then we will replacing Pr(X=x) with Pr(Sx). Lets denote this probability with px ·δt. We are
now able to determine the probability Pr(T ∈ [t, t+δt]|X =x) = Pr(St|Sx) = Pr(St)/Pr(Sx) =[
P (t, x−t)·(δt)2
]
/(px ·δt). Our density function Px(t) is this divided by δt. It follows that the
density function of Pr(Tg ∈ [tg, tg+δt]|Xg = x) is Px,g(tg) = cgPT (tg)PEg(x−tg). Here cg is the
multiplicative constant needed to make the area under the density functions one.
3.6.3 Proof for Non-Uniform Talent or Extreme X Values (r(x) = 0)
Theorem 6 Let talent distribution to be arbitrary within the groups shared sub-range [tmin, tmax].
Let group B environment distribution EB be an arbitrary log-concave distribution. Let A’s be
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EA = EB +K. Let the performance scores be calculated with Xg = Tg + Eg. It follows that
∀t̂ P r(TB≥ t̂|XB=x) ≥ Pr(TA≥ t̂|XA=x)
Exp(TB |XB=x) > Exp(TA|XA=x)
Proof of Theorem 6: Let PT (t) denote the density function of the talent distribution T and PEg (e)
for the environment distribution Eg. Lets compare PEA(e) and PEB (e). Having EA=EB+K gives
PEA(e)δe = Pr(EA∈ [e, e+δe]) = Pr(EB+k∈ [e, e+δe]) = Pr(E∈ [e−k, e+δe]) = PEB (e−k)δe. Define
Êg(t) to be PEg (x−t). Note that ÊA(t) = PEA(x−t) = PEB ((x−t)−k) = PEB (x−(t+k)) = ÊB(t+k).
Define H(t) = ÊB(t)/ÊA(t). The definition of EB being log-concave is that H(t) is increasing.
Lemma 2 states that the density function of Pr(Tg ∈ [t, t+ δt]|Xg = x) is Px,g(t) =






To simplify notation, let’s define a functional F , which for any function R(t) gives the fraction of






Hence we can write
Pr(Tg≥ t̂|Xg=x) = F(PT Êg)
Recall that H(t) = ÊB(t)/ÊA(t) is increasing. Let c be the constant H(t̂). Hence ∀t ∈ [tmin, t̂) we
have H(t)/c < 1 and ∀t ∈ (t̂, tmax] we have H(t)/c > 1. Hence, for any function R(t), multiplying
R(t) by H(t)/c decreases R(t) for those t before t̂ and increase those after. It follows that the
fraction of the area under the curve R(t) that is right of the t= t̂ increases, i.e. F(R) < F(H/c·R).
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Similarly, F(R) = F(cR). The result follows
Pr(TA≥ t̂|XA=x) = F(PT ÊA) = F(cPT ÊA) < F(H ·PT ÊA)
= F(ÊB/ÊA ·PT ÊA)
= F(PT ÊB) = Pr(TB≥ t̂|XB=x)
Lemma 3. If ∀t̂ P r(TB≥ t̂|XB=x) > Pr(TA≥ t̂|XA=x), then Exp(TB |XB=x) > Exp(TA|XA=
x).





























In this theorem’s analysis, we have considered numerous Talent and Environment distributions and
outlined several conditions for which hiring individuals from the disadvantaged group is beneficial
for the employer from an accuracy standpoint. In addition, we also bound the difference in the
expected values of talents of the advantage and disadvantaged group individuals with the same
score for Gaussian and Uniform distributions.
Our modest hope with our work is to demonstrate to the employers the talent advantage




Related Research Work Review
4.1 Introduction
During our research, we came across several research works which were similar to our model and
the main idea we set out to prove i.e. in Theorem 1 (Section 3). In total, we covered 12 different
research works [23, 19, 18, 26, 25, 1, 24, 9, 17, 33, 12, 13]. While we studied each of these works in
detail, however in the thesis, we will cover 6 of these works, which are most relevant to us. Other
works such as Roth et al.[9] considered individual fairness, which were impertinent to our work and
therefore we will not discuss the remaining 6 works in detail.
For each of these research works, we will consider our main claim from Theorem 1 and
verify whether it holds in the setting of each of the individual models. That is, in each of the
models, we are looking for the phenomenon that given two individuals have the same performance
score or feature sets, the disadvantaged is likely to be more talented.
In addition, we compare the worldview of each of the individual models with our worldview.
Our prime motivation to draft a new model of considering Talent and Environment in calculating
the performance score was the belief that all demographic groups are born equal, and that the
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circumstances around the disadvantaged groups are not as conducive as for the advantaged group.
Hence the assumption of Talent distribution being the same for all groups supports the idea that
the talent among demographic groups is equitably distributed, while the Environment distribution
captures the difference in support available to individuals. However, other research works in fairness
in machine learning have different theoretical models, within which they model the sources of
disparities between groups and solve the problem of bias against the disadvantaged.
The following list will briefly cover why we have chosen to include the following six research
works in the thesis.
1. Downstream Effects Of Affirmative Action: The Kannan et.al.[19] paper was the initial
motivation for us to work in the field of Group Fairness in Machine Learning, which describes
a two-staged model where the students are first admitted to college on the basis of their
scores. Those students are hired by an employer based on college grades. Given the model,
this work studies which Fairness Goals (such as Equal Opportunity and Irrelevance of Group
Membership) could be achieved by the college by updating its admissions rule and grading
policy. There are many similarities in this work as compared to ours, the score distributions
are Gaussian and they use threshold functions as their hypothesis classes. While this work
proposes a two-staged model, our model is single-staged. The Section 4.2 will cover the
model, assumptions and main results of this paper in detail. In addition, the section will also
illustrate potential similarities with our work.
2. The Disparate Effects of Strategic Manipulation: In this work by Immorlica et. al.[18],
the model, scores distributions and the results discussed are very similar to ours. The term
“strategic manipulation” in this paper[18] refers to the students ability to trick the classifiers
such as the SAT test exam by manipulating their feature vectors. The students could achieve
this by taking professional test prep services which could help them trick the classifier. And
to model disadvantage, this ability to deceive the classifier is not equitably distributed across
the group i.e. the disadvantaged have might face a higher cost when trying to manipulate
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their features. The main results of this paper show that whenever one group’s costs are
higher than the other’s, the learner’s equilibrium strategy (unconstrained learning) exhibits
an inequality-reinforcing phenomenon wherein the learner erroneously creates False Positives
on the advantaged group, and False negatives of the disadvantaged group. The study also
take in account the subsidy intervention (Affirmative Action) and shows cases where the
subsidy hurts both the groups.
3. Simplicity Creates Inequity: In this work by Kleinberg et. al.[23], there is a discussion
on how in order to achieve interpretability, simplicity could in-fact harm the disadvantaged
group and increase the bias among groups. More formally, this paper proposes a framework
for producing simple prediction functions and shows two results. First, a simplified function
is strictly improvable in both equity and accuracy and hence simplification doesn’t help
to achieve fairness or interpretability. Second, a simple function creates incentive for the
employer to use group membership information which is used against the disadvantaged
members. Our main inspiration behind choosing this research work in our final thesis was
that the results are in contrast with our model. Not only our theorem 1’s results are inverted
in this paper’s model, but also the worldview of population distribution discussed in the work
doesn’t consider equally distributed talents.
4. From Fair Decision Making to Social Equality: This work by Srebro et. al.[26] is novel
in terms of its comparison with the long-term influence of applying fairness interventions
on the underlying population also known as dynamics. The final results of this work show
that there are conditions when the Unconstrained Policy achieves the population equality
over long term while Demographic Parity causes harm. On the other hand, in more realistic
scenarios Unconstrained Policies will not result in equality while DP in these cases could
achieve equality. Since this work looks at Group Fairness from dynamics perspective, and
shows the effect of Demographic Parity on the downstream, it is co-related with our work.
Section 4.5 will cover this model and dynamics discussed in the work and will also show how
the Unconstrained learning is always disadvantaged for Group B as the classifier commits
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False Positives on Group A and False Negatives on Group B individuals.
5. Delayed Impact of Fair machine learning: This work (Liu et. al.[25]) as the name
suggests considers the delayed impact or dynamics of applying fairness policies on the
population distribution, i.e.: long-term improvement, stagnation, and decline in a variable
of interest. This work considers a study of one-step feedback model with common fairness
criteria such as demographic parity which in general do not promote improvement over time,
and may even cause harm in certain cases where using an unconstrained objective would work
better. Then they considers the delayed impact of three standard criteria and also determine
their impact on the utility graphs. The Section 4.6 will demonstrate the model and a novel
tool called Outcome Curve, which is helpful in comparison of delayed impact of different
fairness constraints.
6. Recovering from Biased Data: This work by Blum et. al.[1] discusses, how to extract the
Bayes Optimal Classifier. This work examines the possibility of extracting the Bayes Optimal
Classifier when the Fairness Constraint is applied to the ERM. This paper has a similar
model as compared to ours. There are two specific types of bias models which were discussed
in this paper, under-representation and misrepresentation. On the other hand, our bias
model is differnet and more general where we model disadvantage through the environment
distribution. In the Section 4.7, there is a detailed discussion of the bias model used by this
work as compared to our model. In addition, the section will compare the final results.
4.2 Research Review 1: Downstream Effects Of Affirmative
Action
This research work by Roth et. al.[19], was the initial motivation for us to start exploring the
Group Fairness policies for our research work. In addition, the model of this paper has a significant
overlap with ours. While we consider a one-staged model, this paper discusses a two-staged model
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of a hiring process. In the first state, high-school students are admitted to the college or university
on the basis of an entrance exam which is signal about their qualifications i.e. (talent/type) with
some Gaussian noise. In the second stage, those students who were admitted to college are be hired
by an employer as a function of their college grades, which are an independently drawn noisy signal
of their types.
The employer who hires at the end of the pipeline is a practical employer (trying to
maximize his profit) and calculates a distribution on the types/talents of the students conditional
on qualifications from Stage 1 and grades from Stage 2. The final results in this paper considers
the conditions under which the two fairness definitions can be met or not. Following is the informal
definitions of the two fairness criteria discussed in this work:
1. Equal opportunity: As proposed in Kannan et.al. [19] (Page 7) the definition of equal
opportunity is different from the one we discussed earlier, as it considers a two-staged model.
The probability that an individual is accepted to college and then ultimately hired by an
employer may depend on an individual’s type, but conditioned on their type, should not
depend on their demographic group.
2. Irrelevance of Group Membership: As proposed in Kannan et.al. [19] (Page 7) IGM takes
into account the rationality of employers, where it claims that the employer who is selecting
employees from the college population should not make hiring decisions based on group
membership.
We will compare in the conclusion Section how the fairness notions IGM and EO overlaps




The model considers two population distributions of students represented by i ∈ {1, 2} where i = 1
is advantaged and i = 2 is disadvantaged. Students have a type drawn from Gaussian distribution
with mean µi and variance σ
2
i , which in practice we don’t have access to. Hence, the Gaussian
distribution is represented as Pi = N(µi, σ
2
i ) and Ti is the random variable. Hence, the Talent
distributions itself are discriminatory as this paper considers that the inherent talent between the
groups is different. This is in contrast to our model where we regard the Talent Distribution to be
same for all the groups.
Continuing with the model, in order to approximate the type of each student, SAT Scores
are used: Si = Ti +X (X being the noise, which follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and
variance 1). The college has Admission Rules Ai(s) : R→ 0, 1 which are binary threshold functions
and different for each group. A student i with SAT Score s is accepted in the university with the
probability Ai(s), such that Ai(s) = 1 a student is accepted (i.e. if she is above the β threshold,
Si ≥ βi) and 0 otherwise.
The second stage to determine the Student type, the paper discusses the use of University
Grade Gi: Every student admitted to the university receives a grade Gi = Ti + Y (where Y follows
a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance γ2). Finally, employer makes a hiring decision:
The employer knows the priors Pi from which talent is sampled, the admission rules A1, A2 used by
the school, the grading policy γ, and observes the grades of the students. An individual is hired if
the employer’s expected utility for accepting a university graduate from population i with grade g
is above the threshold C, which is the cost to the employer to hire the individual:
E[Ti|Gi = g,Ai = 1] ≥ C
Hence, a rational employer will hire a student if the above inequality holds. As there are
many employers, we consider that the range of possible C values is C ∈ [C−, C+].
53
4.2.2 Fairness Definitions
There were two main fairness definitions proposed in this paper:
• Equal Opportunity (EO): This definition of equal opportunity is a little different from the
one we discussed earlier, as this considers two stages of admissions. In this case we say that
equal opportunity holds of conditional on the talents, the probability of a student being hired
by the employer is not dependent on their group membership. i.e. if for all types t ∈ R,
∫
g
Pr[G1 = g&A1 = 1|T1 = t].1{E[T1|G1 = g&A1 = 1]} =∫
g
Pr[G2 = g&A2 = 1|T2 = t].1{E[T2|G2 = g&A2 = 1]}
• Irrelevance of Group Membership (IGM): IGM on the other hand holds, if the expected value
of talent being greater than the employer threshold holds for both the groups simultaneously
conditioned on if they are admitted to the college. i.e. if for all grades g ∈ R,
E[T1|G1 = g&A1 = 1] ≥ C ⇐⇒ E[T2|G2 = g&A2 = 1] ≥ C
Next, this work considers different conditions under which we can guarantee the different
fairness conditions hold.
4.2.3 Main Results
The below results will discuss the specific Noise distributions and assumptions under which the two
fairness goals could be met. However in the worst-case we will see that none of the fairness goals
are met.
Case 1: Noiseless Exam Scores
Considers that when hiring a student in the college, the SATs and the high school grades that are
used to admit a student are noiseless i.e. the scores perfectly reflect the talent of the individuals.
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Of course, this assumption is not practical, however this is the best case scenario for ensuring the
two fairness goals are met.
The papers shows that if the model is noiseless then above two fairness goals can be
simultaneously achieved only by highly selective colleges (i.e. those with high admissions thresholds
greater than C+) — and only if they do not report grades to employers.
Claim. Suppose Si = Ti , i.e. a student’s score perfectly reveals his type. Then for any hiring
interval of hiring costs [C−, C+] ∈ R, the non-zero admissions rule:
Ai(s) = 1⇔ s ≥ C+ (4.1)
for both groups i ∈ 1, 2 satisfies IGM and Equal Opportunity when paired with any grading policy.
The Single Employer Threshold Case
Let’s assume that the grades and SAT scores are noisy and instead of considering a range of
thresholds for different employers, this section considers that there is only one employer and has
a cost C. If such is the case, then IGM is achievable although we lose Equal Opportunity. More
formally, for any grading scheme, and with a single threshold C, the college can separately set
different admissions thresholds β∗1 and β
∗
2 for the two groups respectively such that the posterior
expectation for a student type from each group crosses the threshold of C at a grade g∗.
Lemma: For any C ∈ R, there exists thresholds β∗1 and β∗2 and a grade g∗ such that
Exp[T1|G1 = g∗, S1 ≥ β∗1 ] = Exp[T2|G2 = g∗, S2 ≥ β∗2 ] (4.2)
Multiple Threshold Case
Finally, in this section we consider that there are multiple employers and hence there there are
many thresholds of hiring costs C ∈ [C−, C+] and that the grades/scores are noisy. In such case,
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the first claim is that IGM is impossible to achieve. The proof in the paper demonstrates this part.
4.2.4 Comparison to our Theorem 1
We now compare the main claim of our Theorem 1 with the findings in this paper. Recall that
Theorem 1 states: Given two individuals with the same scores, the person who belongs to the
disadvantaged group is expected to be more talented. i.e. Exp[t|x&B] = tB > tA = Exp[ t|x&A]
or equivalently ∀c, Pr[t ≥ c|x&B] > Pr[t ≥ c|x&A].
We say that the definitions of IGM and EO use a similar comparison criteria of fixing the
performance scores of the individuals in order to compare i.e. in both of the definitions, this work
conditions on having fixed grades and being admitted to college which is comparable to conditioning
on having the same scores performance scores in our theorem’s setting. However with this paper’s
model, it cannot be guaranteed that the our claim for Theorem 1 would hold as this work starts
with the assumption that the Talent distribution for the disadvantaged group is inherently lower.
4.2.5 Worldview Comparison
The paper Downstream Effects of Affirmative Action [19] was the initial motivation for us to consider
the problem of screening decisions where we want to hire a candidate given her scores. There are
two limitations of this paper from the bias model’s standpoint. First, the Talent Distributions
Ti(refereed to as Type) is different for different groups (i represents the group membership). Second,
as discussed in Section 4.2, the paper discusses two-staged model where this work assumes that
even after going though the university, the type distributions do not change i.e. disadvantaged
group remains at a lower talent distributions. Therefore, this research work’s model can be viewed
as discriminatory against the disadvantaged group. Hence, we conclude that this work’s worldview
is in contrast to our model.
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4.3 Research Review 2: The Disparate Effects of Strategic
Manipulation
4.3.1 Introduction
The term “strategic manipulation” in this paper[18] refers to the students ability to trick the
classifiers such as the SAT test exam by manipulating their feature vectors. The students could
achieve this by taking professional test prep services which could help them trick the classifier.
And to model disadvantage, this ability to deceive the classifier is not equitably distributed across
the group i.e. the disadvantaged have might face a higher cost when trying to manipulate their
features. The main results of this paper show that whenever the cost of manipulation of the
disadvantaged group are higher than the advantaged group, any classifier with equilibrium strategy
which basically selects same threshold for the two groups will reinforce the inequality between the
groups. The learner does that by erroneously creating False Positives on the advantaged group, and
False negatives of the disadvantaged group. The study also take in account the subsidy intervention
(Affirmative Action) and show cases where the subsidy hurts both the groups.
4.3.2 Model and Notion
To briefly state the model, consider that the candidates have innate set of features x ∈ X = [0, 1]d
belonging to Group A or B, who respond by manipulating their features to cross the classifier’s
threshold and get selected.
The manipulation costs are defined according to group such that a candidate from group m
who wishes to move from a feature vector x to a feature vector y must pay a cost of cm(y)− cm(x)
where y ≥ x. To model disadvantage, the study assumes that
cA(y)− cA(x) ≤ cB(y)− cB(x),∀y > x (4.3)
57
i.e. Group A members pay a lower cost than Group B and the cost functions are monotone
increasing with the features. This cost could be thought of as the hardships individuals face while
trying afford the tuition fees for SAT test prep services. As its more difficult for the disadvantage
group to earn the sum required to pay the tuition than the advantaged, the cost for group B is
higher.
Consider that DA and DB are the distributions over unmanipulated features and to be
subject to different true labeling functions hA and hB defined as
hA(x) =

1 ∀x such that
∑d
1 wA,ixi ≥ τA
0 ∀x such that
∑d




1 ∀x such that
∑d
1 wB,ixi ≥ τB
0 ∀x such that
∑d
1 wB,ixi < τB
(4.5)
We assume that hA(x) = 1 =⇒ hB(x) = 1 for all x ∈ [0, 1]. For instance, in the SATs,
previous works[5] show that the scores are skewed for the demographic groups, with disadvantaged
having a lower threshold i.e. τB < τA. Just like τA and τB are the true thresholds on the
unmanipulated features, σA and σB are the thresholds upon manipulated features.
Then the learner issues a classifier f generating binary outputs and each candidate observes











[hm(x) = 1, f(y) = 0] (4.6)
where CFP and CFN denote the cost of a false positive and a false negative respectively.
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4.3.3 Result 1: Equilibrium Analysis
Suppose the cost condition says that group B members face greater costs to manipulation than
group A members. Then for an unconstrained or undominated learner, this work proves the
following: [18] Given group cost functions cA and cB and true label thresholds τA and τB where
τB ≤ τA, there exists a space of undominated learner threshold strategies [σB , σA] ⊂ [0, 1] where
σA = c
−1
A (cA(τA)+1) and σB = c
−1
B (cB(τB)+1). That is, for any error penalties CFP and CFN , the




1 ∀y ≥ σ
0 ∀y < σ
(4.7)
To explain this analysis, if the equilibrium classifier were trained on only the samples from
Group A, then σ = σA and vice versa. While when the classifier contains samples from both Group
A and B, then the equilibrium classifier return a classifier σ∗ ∈ (σB , σA). This is demonstrated in
the figure 4.1 which shows how σ∗ commits false positive on group A and false negatives on group
B. This is the result of Theorem 1 discussed in this work.
Figure 4.1: Hu et. al.[18] Figure 1, Group cost functions for a one-dimensional feature x. τA and
τB signify unmanipulated true thresholds. The threshold σA and σB perfectly classify group A and
B candidates; A learner selects an equilibrium threshold σ∗ ∈ [σB , σA], committing false positives
on group A (red bracket) and false negatives on group B (blue bracket).
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4.3.4 Result 2: Learner Subsidy Strategy
The second result of the work, although not directly related with our conclusion claims that
Subsidies can harm both groups. The main idea behind subsidy(or Affirmative Action) is that
since the strategic manipulation cost for group B is higher, perhaps the learner could provide a cost












[hm(x) = 1, f(y) = 0]+λ∗cost(f, β)
(4.8)
If above is the learner’s error, then Theorem 2 holds:
Theorem 2 (Subsidies can harm both groups). Finally, the second theorem in this work suggests
that there exists cases when providing subsidy will be harmful to both the groups, and in fact both
the groups would have been better of had they not tried to manipulate their score distribution.
Even Group B with a subsidy of Affirmative action will suffer.
4.3.5 Comparison with our work
Comparison with our Theorem 1
The model discussed in this work conforms to our Theorem 13. As discussed in Section 4.3.2, the
model discussed in this work assumes that the SAT scores are skewed for the two groups even
before manipulation and therefore τB < τA. In addition, if we have the true labeling functions hA
and hB then the assumption in this work is that
hA(x) = 1 =⇒ hB(x) = 1 (4.9)
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Using 4.9 we can interpret that for one particular value of x, if the individual belongs to Group B,
he is expected to be more talented.
Figure 4.2: Hu et. al.[18] (figure from FATML 2019 talk) Distribution for DA and DB with true
thresholds τA and τB
This could also be analyzed graphically as in the figure 4.2, in the region between τB and
τA, if any x ∈ A then h(x) = 0 while if x ∈ B then h(x) = 1. In all the other regions either both
are 0 or both are 1. Hence, this follows our idea of Theorem 1 (3).
4.3.6 Worldview Comparison
The assumption regarding the manipulated and unmanipulated score distribution is that both are
biased against the disadvantaged group B. However at the same time, the “true” thresholds are also
lower for the disadvantaged group B. This is demonstrated in figure 4.1, where τB < τA and though
the scores distributions are biased against group B, however this distribution does not represent
the talents of the groups. The actual capabilities could be derived using τB and τA which are such
that τB < τA and this signifies that the talents might be relatively the same for two groups. As
the figure shows that almost the similar fraction from both the groups are talented, therefore we
consider this worldview to be consistent with ours.
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4.4 Research Review 3: Simplicity Creates Inequity
This work by Kleinberg et. al.[23] outlines a tension between equity (fairness of predictor) and
simplicity (interpretability). Although interpretability through simplicity can assist in ascertaining
whether or not a decision is biased or not, simplicity could in turn increase bias.
More formally, this paper proposes a framework for producing simple prediction function
and has two main results. First, is that a simplified function is strictly improvable in both equity
and accuracy and hence simplification doesn’t help to achieve fairness or interpretability. Second, a
simple function creates incentive for the employer to use group membership information which is
used against the disadvantaged members.
4.4.1 Model
This section will summarize the most relevant parts of the model to compare with our findings. The
model overall represents a process of admissions or screening where an applicant is described by a
set of (boolean) variables x = (x〈1〉, x〈2〉...x〈k〉). To denote group membership, consider one more
coordinate appended to the feature vector (x,A) or (x,D), where A represents the Advantaged
and D represents the disadvantaged.
Assume a function f which perfectly demonstrates the productivity f(x) of an applicant
with features x and is independent of group membership i.e. f(x,A) = f(x,D) = f(x) and the
objective is to sort by f − values and admit the top r fraction.
To model disadvantage for Group D, the paper consider the Likelihood ratio condition







where µ(x, γ) = fraction of population with features x and group membership γ. To state simply,
the above disadvantage condition means that better feature vectors are more represented in Group
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A.
Simplification: The simplification of a function f say g does not consider one or more of the
features from the feature vector.
Given the above disadvantage condition there are two main results discussed in this paper which
considers simplification. First, for every admission rule based on simplified variation of function
f say g, there exists another function h such that h has a better equity (more fair) and higher
accuracy than group D. Section 4.4.2 will cover an example if finding in more detail. Second, if we
consider a group agnostic simplification of the function f say g by not considering one of the feature
from the feature vectors— the efficiency of the resulting admission rule goes up, and the equity
goes down. We conclude that even though group membership is irrelevant to the true value of f ,
any group-agnostic simplification of f creates an incentive for a decision-maker to use knowledge of
group membership- an incentive that wasn’t present before simplification, and one that hurts the
disadvantaged group D. The Section 4.4.2 will cover one example to illustrate this.
4.4.2 Results
Simplicity transforms disadvantage into bias
When the true function f for ranking the applicants does not depend on an individual’s group
membership i.e. f(x,A) = f(x,D) = f(x) , then any non- trivial simplification of this function
creates an incentive to use the group membership information in a way that hurts the disadvantaged
group.
To demonstrate this, we now consider an example in Table 4.1. The table shows the
feature vector having two binary attributes x = [x〈1〉, x〈2〉], group membership γ, the utility function
f and fraction of population with features x and group membership γ represented by µ.
In the table 4.1, and suppose that the true criterion is the conjunction (dot-product) of
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x〈1〉 x〈2〉 γ f µ
1 1 D 1 1/18
1 1 A 1 4/18
1 0 D 0 2/18
1 0 A 0 2/18
0 1 D 0 2/18
0 1 A 0 2/18
0 0 D 0 4/18
0 0 A 0 1/18
Table 4.1: Table showing the features and f-values(Table taken from EC’19 talk ([22]))
x〈1〉 and x〈2〉. To support likelihood condition4.10, consider that applicants from group A have
x〈i〉 = 1 with probability 2/3 and applicants from group B have x〈i〉 = 1 with probability 1/3.
Using these probabilities, we can fill all the values in table 4.1. Then for all admission rates with
r ≤ 5/18, we have f = 1 (utility) and 15 is the fraction of group D’s representation(equity).
Now, let’s consider simplifying the function f by dropping x〈2〉 and using only x〈1〉 in
decision making. There are numerous reasons why shall we ignore x〈2〉 such as
1. Perhaps x〈2〉 is expensive to collect.
2. Increase interpretability of the model by reducing cognitive complexiety.
3. Removing a variable that confers disadvantage.
4. Out of sample generalization.
This simplification will hurt group D as shown in table 4.2. For all the selection rates r ≤ 518 D’s
representation increases from 15 in table 4.1 to
1
3 in table 4.2 but the average f-value has reduced
from 1 to 59 . Hence, this simplification shows that there are gains in equity but loss in efficiency.
One may argue that since this improves the equity between two groups, simplification
may help in ensuring fairness. However, this simplification will transform group D’s disadvantage
into bias. To elaborate this, consider the table 4.3, where g represents the simplification of true
function f . Knowing group membership gives the employer conditional information and accuracy
incentive about the average g values, i.e. if we had access to both x〈1〉 and x〈2〉 as in table 4.1 then
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the employer does not need to know group membership because she knows all feature vectors of the
applicants. However when we drop x〈2〉 then as shown in 4.3 the knowledge of group membership
will help improve accuracy. This is because selecting from group A will have the expected accuracy
of g = 2/3 as opposed to 1/3 in the group D.
Hence, The employer with the access to group membership will now hire individuals from
Group A first and this hurts group D.
x〈1〉 x〈2〉 γ g µ
1 any any 5/9 1/2
0 any any 0 1/2
Table 4.2: Simplification: Not considering x〈2〉 and γ (Table taken from EC’19 talk ([22]))
x〈1〉 x〈2〉 γ g µ
1 any A 2/3 1/2
1 any D 1/3 1/2
0 any A 0 1/2
0 any D 0 1/2
Table 4.3: Simplification: Not considering only x〈2〉 (Table taken from EC’19 talk ([22]))
Simplicity is not Pareto Optimal
Theorem shows Simplifying is not Pareto Optimal if you only care about efficiency and equity.
Considering that the simplification of the true function f is g such that g is structurally simple for
building more interpretable models — then it can be replaced with a another function h possibly
more complex that improves on both- performance and equity. In other words, using a simple
rule is not necessarily a trade-off between performance and equity, but as a step that necessarily
sacrifices both properties relative to other options in the design of a rule.
If we contrast the tables 4.2 and 4.4, then table 4.3 could be re-written as 4.4 by slicing
out entries of group D from the first row with f = 1 and placing it on the top. Now when the
employer hires, it would admit group D first and then group A therefore increasing equity for
r ≤ 518 and also improving accuracy as for any rate r ≤
1
18 , the accuracy is 1.
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x〈1〉 x〈2〉 γ h µ
1 1 D 1 1/18
1 any any 1/2 8/18
0 any any 0 1/2
Table 4.4: Not Pareto Optimal (Table taken from EC’19 talk ([22]))
4.4.3 General Theorem
The general theorem covers the two results discussed in the Section 4.4.2. The informal version of
the general theorem is as stated below[23]:
Theorem: For every Boolean function f with real-valued outputs satisfying the disad-
vantage condition 4.10 and a genericity assumption (i.e. beyond the condition f(x,A) = f(x,D),
there are no “coincidental” equalities in the average values of f), then for every simplification g of
f (partitioning the feature vectors into cells by fixing variables):
1. There is always an f − approximator that strictly improves on g in both equity and efficiency.
2. If g does not use group membership, then by adding group membership variable will increase
accuracy and reduce equity.
4.4.4 Comparison with our Theorem 1
We now compare the general theorem discussed in this paper with our Theorem 1 (Section 3) which
informally states: Given that the groups have same talent distributions and consider two individuals
who have the same scores, then hiring the disadvantaged individual is expected to be more accurate.
Simplicity Creates Inequity paper [23] on the other hand concludes that when we have simplified
model and two individuals have the same scores, then hiring the advantaged individual has a higher
utility as demonstrated in Section 4.4.2 table 4.2.
To conclude, our finding suggests the opposite of the first result of the Simplicity Creates
Inequity paper 4.4.2 because the model discussed in this paper is restricted to the cases of only
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simple functions as discussed. In addition, this paper assumes that the function f i.e. the true
function which gives the score is group agnostic i.e. f(x,A) = f(x,D) which is not the case in our
work as we consider that performance scores are biased according to the group.
To conclude, Theorem 1 does not overlap with the result of Simplicity Creates Inequity
paper [23] however to explain the tension we highlight the two assumptions (Genericity and
Likelihood) made in the Klienberg paper[23] which are in contrast to ours. Furthermore, we show
that the commonalities in our second finding overlaps with this paper as the unconstrained learning
in both works only hurts Group B.
4.4.5 Worldview Comparison
This work by Kleinberg et. al.[23] has the world’s assumption that the disadvantaged group’s
distribution in general has fewer talented people. This paper discusses about two functions in its
model, first is the true function f and the second is the simplified function h and shows that using
simplified version of a function may increase bias. This assumption is therefore a discriminatory
view of the world, considering that even the true function f will result in finding more talented





In other words, better to worse feature vectors are according to the true distribution
function f are favourable to Group A. Therefore, this research work assumes a worldview which can
be deemed discriminatory, as the distribution which is generated using the true function considers
that the fraction of talented individuals in the disadvantaged is lesser than the disadvantaged group.
This belief is not comparable to our model’s talent distribution, since we considered that the talent
is equitably distributed.
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4.5 Research Review 4: From Fair Decision Making To So-
cial Equality
4.5.1 Introduction
Similar to Liu et al.[25], this paper focuses on the delayed impact(referred as dynamics) or the long
term influence of applying Fairness interventions on the population. Considering that the notion
of balance is eventual equality between the qualifications of the groups, this paper asks that does
affirmative action(demographic parity) lead to it? This paper proposes a model which considers
the dynamics similar to previous works[25, 16] which propose a utility function representing the
profit/loss which is brought by an individual, and conclude whether that improves the group
distribution.
The main results of this paper compares two fairness interventions — Unconstrained
learning and demographic parity. It shows that unconstrained learning could reach eventual equality
between the two groups given the conditions. And when Unconstrained learning doesn’t reach
equality, applying demographic parity could increase utility. Furthermore, although applying
demographic parity may improve utility, there is a danger that the society settles at a worse-case
equilibrium when under-accepting and better equilibrium when over-accepting as summarized
below:
• Under-acceptance of qualified individuals was shown to guarantee equality at the cost of worse
institutional utility and possibly decreasing the population’s overall qualification level.
• In over-acceptance case it shows equality cannot be directly guaranteed to hold but when it
does, it results, in equilibrium where the population becomes more qualified.
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4.5.2 Model
The model is similar to previous works[25, 16, 19] which consider institutional utility in order to
access the delayed or downstream impact on population distribution.
The group membership is represented by G where G = A would represent the advantaged
group with the fraction gA and the disadvantaged group G = B with fraction gB = 1− gA. Feature
Vector θ ∈ Θ contains the information about the applicant’s qualification such as θ= [GPA, SAT,
Letters of recommendation]. This θ is implicitly mapped through an estimator F : θ → {0, 1}
Although this paper talks about the feature vectors, it considers a function F : θ → {0, 1} which
provides a crisp evaluation of of the qualification v = 1 if qualified and v = 0 otherwise. Hence the
features are not discussed any further in this work.
The Qualification Profile(π) represents the probability distribution for a particular
evaluation(V ) and group(G) such that the qualification profile of V = v in group G = j is
π(V = v|G = j). The Institutional Policy (τ is defined by an institution or a policy maker, which
maps each individual to a policy of selection τ(V = v;G = j) : {0, 1} × {A,B} → {0, 1}.
Institutional Utility U(τ) is defined considering that u{0, 1} → R; v → u(v) to be the





v∈{0,1} u(v).τ(V = v;G = j).π(v|G = j)
The Selection Rates(β) for a group j are defined as: β(G = j) =
∑
v∈{0,1} u(v).τ(V =
v;G = j).π(v|G = j)




The execution of a selection policy can be thought of as demarcating time t. The main idea of the
paper is to looks at the effects of the selection process and how it affects the population. Hence, we
would be interested in looking at the difference between the qualification profiles (π) at time t and
t+ 1. Consider the following assumption
Assumption 1 (Dynamics): For a given group j , let πt(1|j) =: πt(1) denote the
qualification profile of group j for v = 1 at time t and let the policies τt at that time step induce
the selection rates βt. Then the qualification profiles at time t+ 1 are given by:








Where f0 and f1 are two arbitrary continuously differentiable functions from [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, 1].
The pair (f0, f1) is referred to as the dynamics. For each group G = j, πt(.|j) describes the potential
qualification profile. In the above assumption the function f1 represents the retention at the top i.e.
the rate of retention of the sub-population with potential v = 1 due to the current policy, and f0
represents change for the better. Similarly, 1− f1 would represent change for the worse and 1− f0
is the retention at the bottom.
Under given dynamics (f0, f1), a policy is said to be equalizing if for all starting π0(1|A)
and π0(1|B) ; we have limt→∞ |πt(1|A)− πt(1|B)| = 0.In other words, the population distribution
shall look the same after sufficient iterations.
4.5.4 Assumptions & Definitions
To demonstrate the final results, this paper considers a few definitions and assumptions which are
as demonstrated below:
Unconstrained maximization would mean that the employer would maximize the utility.
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maxτ Ut(τ)
Also, it is straightforward to see that for the Unconstrained policy, the optimal policies are
τt(1; .) = 1 andτt(0; .) = 0 for all time t.
Affirmative Action: The affirmative action constraint forces the policy to select at an
equal rate between the two groups, i.e.:
β(A) = β(B)
Within affirmative action, There are two possible cases through which affirmative action
impacts the policy, denoted by AA+ and AA− which stands for Over-acceptance and Under-
acceptance. These represent two drastically different approaches to fairness.
Under-acceptance (AA−)
If gj ∗ u(1) + (1− gj) ∗ u(0) ≤ 0, then
τt(1; j) =
πt(1|¬j)
πt(1|j) , τt(0; j) = 0 (under-acceptance),
τt(1;¬j) = 1, τt(0;¬j) = 0 ,
AA− (under acceptance) accepts fewer qualified individuals from the advantaged group so
as to equalize the selection rates for qualified individuals between both groups. One could think
of AA− as increasing the standard for the advantaged group and as such reducing total selection
rates. Similarly we define over-acceptance:
Over-acceptance(AA+): One could think of it as reducing the standard for the disadvantaged
group.
If gj ∗ u(1) + (1− gj) ∗ u(0) > 0, then
τt(1; j) = 1, τt(0; j) = 0
τt(1;¬j) = 1, τt(0;¬j) = πt(1|j)−πt(1|¬j)1−πt(1|¬j) (over-acceptance)
71
Finally, also consider assumption 2 before we outline the final results.
Assumption 2: The dynamics under the unconstrained policy (UN) can be written as
f(π) := πf1(0, π) + (1− π)f0(0, π) and we assume that f is LUN − Lipschitz with LUN < 1,
meaning that ∀π, π′ ∈ [0, 1] :
|f(π)− f(π′)| ≤ LUN |π − π′| (4.11)
4.5.5 Results
The main results in this paper could be summarized as follows: affirmative action (demographic
parity) is considered as the mean to achieve equality in the qualifications of different groups.
Imposing of affirmative action with the under-acceptance strategy of qualified individuals was shown
to guarantee equality but at the cost of worse institutional utility and a decrease in the population’s
overall qualification level. In the second strategy of affirmative action i.e. the over-acceptance of
unqualified individuals, however to lead to a policy with different characteristics: equality cannot be
directly guaranteed to hold but when it does, it results, in equilibria where the population becomes
more qualified.
The first result considers the UN strategy which is similar to our unconstrained strategy.
This papers looks at the dynamics over time for the UN, where it informally states that if UN
achieves equilibrium, it achieves it in a similar way as that of under-acceptance, while there are
cases when equilibrium is not achieved. This is illustrated in Theorem 1 and figure 4.3
Theorem 1: If equality in population distributions is reached with an unconstrained
(UN) policy by way of assumption 2, then it is necessarily reached by an AA− policy implemented
over all time steps, however with no more, and possibly less, utility at each step.
The second result discussed in this paper informally states that whenever AA– equalizes
dynamics, it always leads to worse long-term utility than under UN by leading to a population with
lower qualification. On the other hand when following AA+, equality is always beneficial. This is
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Figure 4.3: Points showing unconstrained equilibriums(Figure 3 from the paper Srebro et. al. [26])
as demonstrated in the figure 4.4.
Theorem 4: If the policy is AA–, then the equalized population generates long-term
utility no higher (and possibly lower) than the limiting population under UN. If the policy is AA+
and it leads to social equality, then the equalized population generates long-term utility no lower
(and possibly higher) than the limiting population under UN.




This paper studies dynamics in affirmative action to equalize the qualifications of different groups.
Imposing under acceptance was shown to guarantee equality at the cost of worse institutional utility
and possibly decreasing the population’s overall qualification level. Over acceptance affirmative
action was shown to lead to a policy with different characteristics: equality cannot be directly
guaranteed to hold but when it does, it results, in equilibria where the population becomes more
qualified.
4.5.7 Comparison with our final results
Our Theorem 1’s (3) findings are irreconcilable with this paper’s model since this paper does not
talk about any bias in the scores. In addition, there is no noise which is considered in the evaluation
of labels for the individuals as the work considers a function F : θ → {0, 1} which provides a crisp
evaluation of of the qualification v = 1 if qualified and v = 0 otherwise. Since our first theorem is
based on the bias in the scores, we cannot compare it with this paper.
4.5.8 Worldview Comparison
As discussed in detail the Section 4.5, this work considers the dynamics of applying fairness
constraints on the population distribution. Hence, although this work considers that the qualification
profiles (π) of different groups are biased such that the disadvantaged group have lower possible
score, but applying the fairness constraints eventually achieves equality amongst the groups.
This model considers dynamics and hence is not directly comparable to our model. However,
the worldview of this model is still similar to our Talent distribution as after applying the fairness
constraint Demographic Parity, this model achieves suggests that there is an equality within the
qualification profiles of the individuals. The main result in this paper could be summarized as
follows: affirmative action (demographic parity) is considered as the mean to achieve equality in
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the qualifications π as t→∞ of different groups.
To conclude, this work’s worldview assumption demonstrates that although initially the
qualification profiles are distorted and biased against the disadvantaged group, however over the
period of time, applying demographic parity will result in equalizing the population’s qualifications.
Hence, the assumption aligns with our model’s Talent distribution equality claim, as over the period
of time the qualification profiles becomes equal.
4.6 Research Review 5: Delayed Impact of Fair Machine
Learning
This work amongst only a few others considers the delayed impact or dynamics of the fairness
interventions we employ to benefit the disadvantaged group. The paper shows that even in one-step
feedback model, common fairness criteria such as demographic parity and equal opportunity do not
promote improvement in certain cases while the unconstrained utility maximization does. Another
interesting finding of this work is with the consideration of Measurement Error, which broadens the
regime in which fairness criteria perform favourably.
The special case of measurement error in this paper is comparable to our model of Talent
and Environment as described in section 3.1.1 and we also show that the result with measurement
error match with our final results in Theorem 1 (3). The below section will summarize the population
distribution and model setup and how it compares to our findings.
4.6.1 Contributions
Given the one-step feedback model[25] and group A represents the disadvantaged group and B the
advantaged. The main results of this work could be summarized in the following three points:
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1. The two fairness criteria discussed (demographic parity, equal opportunity) can lead the
three possible outcomes i.e. improvement, stagnation, and decline in the the change in score
distributions in natural parameter regimes. Also, there are a class of settings where equal
selection rates cause decline, whereas equal true positive rates do not.
2. This paper also introduces the concept of outcome curve which helps compare Fairness
Regimes/interventions in the scores-utility setting discussed in the model (4.6.2).
3. Finally, the paper introduces certain types of measurement errors (e.g., the banks underesti-
mating the repayment ability only for the disadvantaged group) affect the comparison. This
is the part where we juxtapose our results with this work and find similarities.
4.6.2 Model
This section briefly discusses the main aspects of the model. The Group A in this work is regarded
as the disadvantaged group while B the advantaged, which is the opposite to all the papers we
reviewed. Also, gA and gB = 1− gA represent the respective fractions of the total population.
The respective score distributions are πA and πB , ∆µj represents the change in score
distribution for group j, which we represents long-term improvement if (∆µj > 0), stagnation if
(∆µj = 0), and decline if (∆µj < 0).
The institution’s policy τ = (τA, τB) are chosen by the institution which corresponds to
the probability the institution selects an individual in group j with score x ∈ X . We assume that
the institution is utility-maximizing. There exists a function u : C → R, such that the institution’s








This work also defines the outcomes in terms of an average effect that a policy τj has on
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Where ∆(x) is the change in the score values. So better scores represent better life and well-being
in general.
Finally, an assumption that the success of an individual is independent of their group
membership given the score x. That is, the scores are without noise and can tell the talent of
an applicant with certainty. Therefore, this work considers a function ρ : X → [0, 1] such that
individuals of score x ∈ X succeed with probability ρ(x). This assumption is formally detailed
assumptions Section 4.6.4.
4.6.3 Outcome Curve
The paper introduces a graphical tool called the outcome curve to determine if a fairness constraint
causes benefit or harm to the scores distribution after classification.
A policy (τA, τB) is said to cause a group:
1. active harm to group j if ∆µj(τj) < 0
2. stagnation if ∆µj(τj) = 0
3. and improvement if ∆µj(τj) > 0.
The MaxUtil policy make the employer makes the most profit and is chosen in a standard
fashion which applies the same threshold τMaxUtil to both groups agnostic of the distributions πA




The paper considers that a policy causes relative harm to group j ∆µj(τj) < ∆µ
MaxUtil
j ,
active harm if ∆µj(τj) < 0 and relative improvement if ∆µj(τj) ≥ ∆µMaxUtilj . The selection rates
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for these thresholds are βj :=
∑
x∈X πj(x)τj(x), demonstrated in the Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Outcome Curve (Figure 1 from Liu et. al. [25])
In the outcome curve figure 4.5, the following rates are of interest. The paper defines
βMaxUtil as the selection rate for A under MaxUtil Policy. The paper also defines β0 as the harm
threshold, such that ∆µA(r
−1
πA(β0)) = 0. Similarly β
∗ is defined as the selection rate such that ∆µ
is maximized. Finally, β̄ is defined as the outcome-complement of the MaxUtil selection rate.
The selection rate β∗ could also be regarded as the philanthropic optimal threshold as the
benifit to the Group A is maximum. Also any selection rate in the Relative Harm or Active harm
region are not desirable results as the βMaxUtil which is the default behaviour of banks perform
better than them.
4.6.4 Results
Using on the outcome curve (fig 4.5), this paper covers a proposition and 5 corollaries which are
based upon an assumption. This section will informally outline the assumption and the main
corollaries.
Assumptions
Assumption 1: The institution’s individual utility is more stringent than the expected score
changes, u(x) > 0→ ∆x > 0, In other words, in the credit risk setting, if an individual defaults on
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Assumption 2 Monotonocity: Assume that the success of an individual is independent of their
group given the score i.e. the score summarizes all relevant information about the success event, so
there exists a function ρ : X → [0, 1] such that individuals of score x succeed with probability ρ(x).
Also, higher scores means higher probability of success. i.e. ρ is strictly increasing in x independent
of the group.
if x1 > x2 then ρ(x1) > ρ(x2) (4.15)
Corollaries
Based on the discussed assumptions, below are the relevant corollaries discussed in this work. For
the corollaries, the selection rates in case for Demographic Parity must be equal, but for Equal
Opportunity we will need to define a transfer function which is a mapping of selection from Group
A to B, G(A→B), which for every loan rate β in group A gives the loan rate in group B that has
the same true positive rate.
To summarize, the corollaries 3.2 states that applying any Fairness Criteria can cause
Relative Improvement, while corollaries 3.3 and 3.4 states that there exists scenarios where all
fairness criterion could cause active harm. Finally, corollary 3.5 and 3.6 states the conditions where
one fairness constraint fails when others don’t.
Corollary 3.2
If the assumption 4.14 holds, then corollary 3.2 states that any fairness criteria can cause relative
improvement. The below scenarios are for demographic parity and equal opportunity respectively.
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A , there exist population
proportions g0 < g1 < 1 such that, for all gA ∈ [g0, g1], βMaxUtilA < β
DemParity
A < β. That is,
DemParity causes relative improvement for group A.
2. Similar to the demographic parity, now consider the equal opportunity case. Under the
assumption that βMaxUtilA < β < β
′ < β̄ such that βMaxUtilB > G
(A→ B)(β), G(A→ B)(β′),
there exist population proportions g2 < g3 < 1 such that, for all gA ∈ [g2, g3], βMaxUtilA <
βDemParityA < β. That is, Equal Opportunity causes relative improvement for group A.
Corollary 3.3 & 3.4
Corollaries 3.3 and 3.4 are comparable and conclude that DemParity and EqOpt can cause harm
by being over eager in the selection rates.
For Demographic parity suppose that we fix the selection rate β which is same for the
two groups and assume that βMaxUtilB > β > β
MaxUtil
A . Then, there exists a population proportion
g0 such that, for all gA ∈ [0, g0], βDemParityA > β. In particular, when β = β0, DemParity causes
active harm, and when β = β̄, DemParity causes relative harm.
Similarly, taking the transfer function, we assume the same for EqOpt. Suppose that
βMaxUtilB > G
(A→B)(β) and G(A→B)(β) > βMaxUtilA . Then, there exists a population proportion g0
such that, for all gA ∈ [0, g0], βEqOptA > β. In particular, when β = β0, DemParity causes active
harm, and when β = β̄, DemParity causes relative harm.
Corollary 3.5 & 3.6
This section is the comparison of Demographic parity and Equal opportunity, and this section
states that there exists scenarios where DemParity performs better than EqOpt and vice versa.
As is evident from the model, in order to compare EqOpt and DemParity, we need to have
a knowledge of the full population distributions πA & πB which will be used to compute the transfer
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function G(A→B). Hence, the corollaries 3.5 & 3.6 states that if we don’t have the knowledge of the
function G(A→B), then EqOpt may avoid active harm where DemParity fails and vice versa.
Fairness Under Measurement Error
This paper initially considers no error in the individual scores. However, it could be the case
where the disadvantaged group’s scores are systematically underestimated, while the scores for the
advantaged group are not. Under such a scenario, this model is comparable to our work.
To define measurement error, the estimate of an individual’s score X ∼ π is prone to errors
e(X) such that X + e(X) := X̂ ∼ π̂. Since the scores are underestimated for the disadvantaged
group, the error for an individual e(X) is negative. In this setting, it is equivalent to consider
the CDF of underestimated distribution π̂ to be dominated by the CDF true distribution π, i.e.∑
x≥c π̂(x) ≤
∑
x≥c π(x) for all c ∈ C, where C is the score range.
The paper then suggests a Preposition that given underestimation, the selection rate βA
falls for the disadvantaged group. Suppose β̂ represents the new selection rate for the underestimated
scores then βMaxUtilA > β̂A
MaxUtil
and βDemParityA > β̂A
DemParity
. Also, if the errors are further
such that the true TPR dominates the estimated TPR, it is also true that βEqOptA > β̂
EqOpt
A .
4.6.5 Comparison with our final results
The concept of measurement error (4.16) is akin to the noisy scores X, which are dependent on
talent and environment in our work (3.1.1). Therefore, we compare our model to the measurement
error section 4.6.4 where the scores are underestimated only for the disadvantaged group. The two
sections below conclude whether our theorems hold in this paper’s model.
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Theorem 1
Theorem 1(3) holds with the delayed impact paper which states that — If we compare two individuals
with the same scores such that one belongs to the advantaged group and the other belongs to the
disadvantaged group, hiring the disadvantaged individual is expected to have higher talent value.
X + e(X) := X̂ ∼ π̂ (4.16)
To prove that our first theorem holds in this model, let’s consider two individuals with
scores X ′A = X
′
B = X
′ where one individual belongs to the disadvantaged group A and the other to
the advantaged group B. However since the distribution for group A is π̂(x) and for B its π(x), the








From equation 4.15, we know that if x1 > x2 then ρ(x1) > ρ(x2) and hence, ρ(X
′′
A) >
ρ(X ′B) which shows that in the measurement error model, hiring disadvantaged individuals with
the same score is expected to have higher success rate.
To conclude, our Theorem 1 holds this paper’s model when we assume the measurement
error in group A’s score measurements.
4.6.6 Worldview Comparison
This research work also considers dynamics where the scores distribution of a population is
represented by πA and πB for groups A and B respectively and these change overtime. This work
considers that the mean of the two population’s score distributions is biased against disadvantaged
to start with, and when we apply fairness interventions these distributions change. Similar to the
dynamics paper (Section [26]), the main aim of this paper is to analyze different fairness criteria
and equalize the different population groups.
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To sum up, this work considers dynamics or downstream effects into account, i.e. the
population distributions are biased against group A to start with, and later on with the fairness
intervention the bias could fade and eventually we could achieve equality. Therefore, this model
also aligns with our model’s Talent distribution equality claim, as over the period of time the
distributions reach equality.
4.7 Research Review 6: Recovering from Biased Data: Can
Fairness Constraints Improve Accuracy?
4.7.1 Introduction
This paper was one of the first motivation behind our basis for comparing fairness constraints. As
we saw in the previous works, several fairness constraints have been proposed in the literature
which recognize that certain demographic groups are treated unfairly and propose rules to fix it.
However this paper consider a different motivation.
This work suggests that if the training data itself is biased in certain way (including having
a more noisy or negatively biased labeling process on members of a disadvantaged group, or a
decreased prevalence of positive or negative examples from the disadvantaged group, or both) then
applying fairness interventions could actually improve accuracy.
Given the biased training data for the disadvantaged group, the main finding of this work is
that an ERM learner subject to the equal opportunity fairness constraint recovers the Bayes optimal
hypothesis, making it an attractive choice for decision makers whose overall concern is purely about
accuracy on the true data distribution. In deriving this finding, this paper contemplates several
fairness interventions such as Demographic Parity, Equalized Odds and data re-weighting.
There are a few assumptions in this work. First, that the Bayes optimal classifiers (h∗A
and h∗B) classify the same fraction (p) of the respective populations as positive. Second, that both
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the population distributions (advantaged and disadvantaged) have the same error rate (bias) η with
respect to h∗A and h
∗
B and that these errors are uniformly distributed. Finally, only the training
data for the disadvantaged population is then biased with the two biased models discussed.
Considering these assumptions, this work proposes that only equal opportunity constraint
will extract the Bayes optimal classifier.
4.7.2 Model
We assume the data lies in some instance space X , such that X ∈ Rd, and two groups, Group A
and Group B, such that P (x ∈ A) = 1− r and P (x ∈ B) = r where r ∈ (0, 1). To know the group
membership, assume that there is a special coordinate of the feature vector x, which denotes group.
The data distribution is given by D = (DA,DB). Assume there exists a pair of Bayes Optimal






B ∈ H : X → {0, 1} and h∗A 6= h∗B then the true labels for
training are generated in such a form:
y = y(x) =

¬h∗(x) with probability η
h∗(x) with probability 1− η
The labels y after this flipping process are the true labels of the training data.
Assumption 1: p = P (h∗A(x) = 1|x ∈ A) = P (h∗B(x) = 1|x ∈ B) — That is equal positive rates
across groups. Hence, η is the same for both the groups and fraction of +ve samples:
p(1− η) + (1− p)η
Assumption 2: The paper also considers that the Bayes Optimal Classifier is different for the two
groups, i.e., h∗A 6= h∗B . If h∗A was also optimal for Group B, then we can just learn h∗ for both
Groups A and B using data only from Group A and biased data concerns fade away. Thus we are
learning a pair of classifiers, one for each demographic group.
Assumption 3: The that h∗ is not perfect and independently with probability η, the true label of
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x does not correspond to the prediction h∗(x).
4.7.3 Bias in Training Data:
As compared to other works, the bias model of this paper considers only two specific types of biases
in the training data only.
1. Under-representation Bias β: In this bias model, the positive examples from Group B
(disadvantaged) are under-represented in the training distribution while for Group A, the
training data reflects the true data. Hence, this model consider a probability β with which a
positively labeled sample is considered in the training data.
2. Labeling Bias ν: Quite similar to the Under-representation Bias, in this model instead of
removing the sample from the training data, its label is flipped from positive to negative with
a probability ν. Thus, for each pair (x, y), if x ∈ B and y = 1, then independently with
probability ν , the label of this point is flipped to negative.
Given these two bias models, this paper then discusses the sampling of training set and then applies
the above two biases on it. A classifier h satisfies equal opportunity if P(x,y)∼D(h(x) = 1|y = 1, x ∈
A) = P(x,y)∼D(h(x) = 1|y = 1, x ∈ B).
4.7.4 Results
This work is mainly about discovering the Bayes Optimal Classifier and compares 4 fairness
interventions in the ERM’s resultant classifiers which are— Equal Opportunity, Equalized Odds,
Demographic Parity and Data Reweighing. Of the four constraints, only equal opportunity is able
to extract the Bayes optimal classifier given the model setup and assumptions. Theorem 1 outlines
the condition which should hold in order for equal opportunity constraint to extract the Bayes
optimal classifier.
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Theorem4.1: Assume true labels are generated by PD,r(h
∗, η) corrupted by both Under
Representation bias and Labeling bias with parameters βPOS , βNEG, ν, and assume that
(1− r)(1− 2η) + r((1− η)βPOS(1− 2ν)− ηβNEG) > 0 (4.17)
and
(1− r)(1− 2η) + r((1− η)βNEG − (1− 2ν)βPOSν) > 0 (4.18)
Then h∗ = (h∗A, h
∗
B) is the lowest biased error classifier satisfying Equality of Opportunity on the
biased training distribution and thus h∗ is recovered by Equal Opportunity constrained ERM.
On the other hand the other three fairness interventions fail. The paper has simple examples about
how they fail.
4.7.5 Comparison with our final results
For the comparison, we now discuss about the distributions for the scores and labels two groups.
The distribution of scores in this work is defined as D and is a pair distributions (DA,DB), with DA
determining how x ∈ A is distributed and DB determining how x ∈ B is distributed. In addition,
the Bayes optimal hypothesis h∗ = (h∗A, h
∗
B) is such that h
∗
A 6= h∗B . Finally, the true labels generated
for a x which is drawn from the distribution D is defined as:
y = y(x) =

¬h∗(x) with probability η
h∗(x) w. p. 1− η
(4.19)
Our Theorem 1’s findings do not hold in this paper’s model and assumptions. This is
mainly due to the different bias models in our work and in this paper. The paper’s model simply
assumes that the distributions for the two groups are different and so is their Bayes hypothesis,
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there is no comparison on how the scores distributions are different. For example, it might be
possible that the distribution DA and DB are Normally distributed where the mean for group B is
higher than the mean for Group A and still the findings of this work will hold.
On the other hand, our model 3.1.1 assumes that the environment is biased in such a way
that it harms Group B, and hence the scores for group B have a lower distribution than group A.
Hence, in this paper’s model setting, if we compare two individuals with the same score (x) values
from the two groups, it is not guaranteed that the disadvantaged individual is expected to be more
talented.
4.7.6 Conclusion
To conclude, this paper shows that equal opportunity constrained ERM will recover from 2 types of
training data bias, including Under-Representation Bias and Labeling Bias, in a clean model where
the Bayes-Optimal classifiers h∗A, h
∗
B satisfy most fairness constraints on the true distribution and
the errors of h∗A, h
∗
B are uniformly distributed.
This paper is limited to only two types of biases, which are not practical, however the
findings that equal opportunity constraints recover the Optimal classifiers still hold with our
Theorem 2’s findings. Furthermore, theorem 1 is not comparable to this work, given this work’s
bias distribution.
4.7.7 Worldview Comparison
Discussed in section 4.7, this research work starts with the assumption that the true distribution is
not biased but its only the training distribution that is biased. It views the world in such a way
that the training data we capture is biased due to human error, or historical bias, however the
real-world test data is free from such bias.
To conclude, the model discussed in this paper has two aspects, first is the real world
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“true” data which is unbiased and represents the true world and the second aspect is that of the
biased training data, which has misrepresentation and under-representation of disadvantaged group.
Therefore, we could compare our Talent distributions with this model’s true real world distributions,
both of which are unbiased.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter we summarise our work and present some concluding remarks. We also discuss the
potential future work.
5.1 Conclusion
The work in this thesis can be summarized as follows:
1. First we present an overview of the recent research works in machine learning fairness with
the objective to accustom a beginner in the field with the terms and research methodologies
commonly used in the literature.
2. We then propose a model with the assumption that the talent distributions for the two groups
are equal and its only because of the environment that the individuals of disadvantaged groups
perform worse on tests. Furthermore, we hypothesize that the test or performance scores
are not simply a representation of an individual’s talent but also of the support environment
available around her.
3. Third, we propose our main theorem in which we considered for several distributions of Talent
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and Environment and showed for which distributions our claim holds. The claim of the
theorem being that, given two individuals having similar performance on a screening test, the
individual from the disadvantaged group is expected to be more talented than the advantage
group.
4. Finally, we have a comparative review of six recent and relevant research works in group
fairness where we cover detailed summary of the model, assumptions and main conclusions
of each of the research works. In addition, we verify whether our theorem’s main claim is
consistent in each of the research work’s settings. We also analyze the different worldviews,
i.e. how the model discussed in these research works view the population distribution of the
world. We see that while there are a few models whose worldviews closely align with our
model’s underlying belief– that talent is the evenly distributed for both the groups– there are
others which view the world from a discriminatory standpoint.
5.2 Future Work
There are a few limitations in our work which could be addressed in the future continued works.
We briefly discuss three such assumptions:
1. Our first assumption is that the performance scores of an individual are equal to the sum of
talents and the environment. However, there could be other factors which could effect the
performance of an individual on a test, and we could extend the current model to account for
them. For example, if an individual is talented and also has a conducive environment around
him, still it is possible for him to perform bad on a test because he is not driven or ambitious.
Furthermore, there could be a luck factor associated when measuring the performance score,
for instance if a talented and good environment student is just unlucky and arrived late for
the exam.
2. Another limitation that our model has is that we always assume that the talent is same for
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the two groups. Here, our model could be extended to allow the two groups to have different
distributions, which could be useful for real world scenarios. For instance, when applying to
armed forces, generally the male would outperform female candidates.
3. We also assume that the performance score is the linear “sum” of talent and environment for
an individual, however this study could be extended to consider more complex functions such
as a quadratic, or polynomials.
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